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END OF THE BEGINNING OR BEGINNING OF 
THE END?  SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY’S STALLED 
SECURITY AGENDA AND THE PROSPECTS 
FOR RESTARTING IT 
Stephen M. Maurer* 
Last year, synthetic biology celebrated its tenth 
anniversary by creating a bacterium around an artificial 
genome.  But a second milestone may have been just as 
important.  Over the years, synthetic biologists have devoted 
enormous effort to identifying security risks and debating 
solutions.  At the same time, they knew that any debate would 
be pointless unless it ended in practical action.  In the end, 
members pursued two strategies.  The first was traditional and 
asked government to write regulations.  The second asked 
industry and academics to govern themselves.  Prior to 2009–
2010, there was no way to know whether either strategy would 
produce useful results.  Optimists and pessimists could see 
what they wanted. 
Today, we know much more, and the news is 
discouraging.  Almost everyone agrees that the security 
agenda’s first and most urgent task is to keep would-be 
terrorists from buying synthetic DNA.  But just how hard 
should companies investigate customer orders before filling 
them?  Mainstream security experts have long agreed that 
many threats do not appear on any list, let alone the U.S. 
government's list of officially regulated “Select Agents.”  For 
the foreseeable future, the only way to detect these threats is 
for human experts to compare each customer request against 
similar published sequences that have well-known biological 
functions.  In November 2009, gene companies around the 
world announced that they would indeed pay human experts 
to do this.  One might have expected the U.S. government to 
endorse this result.  Instead, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) announced draft guidelines that 
encouraged companies to adopt a weaker procedure (“Best 
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Match”) that can only detect sequences derived from Select 
Agents.  The guidelines became final in October of 2010. 
Surely, this is a modest return for ten years of effort.  
Worse, it signals that the U.S. government will shelter 
industry from strong biosecurity standards even when 
industry has already agreed to them.  If so, synthetic biology’s 
security agenda has been so much wasted effort.  Clearly, it is 
time for a closer look.  This Article examines what synthetic 
biologists have done to improve biosecurity over the past 
decade and asks how much additional progress can be 
expected.  Parts I through III introduce synthetic biology, the 
economic and scientific forces that have driven it for the past 
decade, and the pressures that persuaded the community and 
eventually the U.S. government to promise improved 
biosecurity.  The Article then turns to the familiar argument 
that attempts to regulate technology are hopeless.  To the 
contrary, Part IV argues that many of the weapons of mass 
destruction (“WMD”) technologies developed over the last 
century were eminently predictable and could have been 
blocked by policymakers.  Part V reviews synthetic biologists’ 
extended debate over when and how to control so-called 
“experiments of concern” that might lead to new and better 
weapons.  Parts VI and VII review synthetic biologists’ 
parallel debate over how to deny the field’s existing 
technologies, including synthetic DNA, to terrorists.  Part 
VIII reviews the community’s failed attempt to implement 
these ideas through a combination of self-governance and 
formal government regulation.  Part IX looks at the prospects 
for additional private standards and government regulation in 
the foreseeable future.  Part X identifies practical reforms that 
would allow synthetic biology to revive its stalled security 
agenda.  Part XI provides a brief conclusion. 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 
“Synthetic biology,” like most phrases beloved of funding agencies, 
is an elastic term.  That said, it is almost always used to describe 
experiments that can only be done with artificial DNA or at the very 
least would not otherwise be affordable.  According to this definition, 
synthetic biology has existed as a distinct discipline since approximately 
the year 2000.1  This dating is particularly satisfying because it makes the 
                                                 
1 This date is inevitably arbitrary.  Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that the field 
existed much before the first gene synthesis companies began operations in 1999.  Stephen 
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field’s tenth anniversary coincide with J. Craig Venter and associates’ 
announcement that they had created a cell entirely controlled by artificial 
DNA.2  However, 2010 also marked a second anniversary.  Since 9/11 
and the Washington anthrax attacks, synthetic biologists have devoted 
enormous energy to identifying security threats and debating policy 
responses.  These activities were only meaningful if government or the 
community was willing to implement them.  This, however, could only 
be judged on the basis of concrete results, and for most of synthetic 
biology’s first decade there were none. 
Today we know much more, and the news is discouraging.  
Synthetic biology’s security priorities have almost always included 
denying synthetic DNA to terrorists.  But just how hard should gene-
makers examine customer orders before filling them?  Academic 
synthetic biologists called on industry to implement meaningful 
screening programs as early as 2006.  In April 2008, a European trade 
association, the International Association Synthetic Biology (“IASB”), 
began developing a private standard that required human experts to 
examine incoming customer orders for threats.  But there was 
opposition.  Indeed, two large gene-makers tried to derail IASB’s 
standard at the last minute by promoting what they called a “fast” and 
“cheap” alternative that would have replaced human experts with 
computers.  This led to a dramatic, Silicon Valley-style standards war 
over biosecurity.  Like most such wars, the market delivered its 
judgment decisively.  By November 2009, more than eighty percent of 
the industry’s installed capacity—including the same companies that 
had previously agitated for fast and cheap solutions—had adopted the 
IASB Code or an equivalent standard.  Furthermore, IASB’s Code had 
spread across the world to include companies in Europe, the United 
States, and even China.3 
                                                                                                             
M. Maurer et al., Making Commercial Biology Safer:  What the Gene Synthesis Industry 
Has Learned About Screening Customers and Orders (Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/Maurer_IASB_Screening.pdf.  
Conversely, the field was clearly self-aware by the time that Professor Bustamonte coined, 
or at least independently reinvented, the phrase “synthetic biology” in 2001.  Luis Campos, 
That Was the Synthetic Biology That Was, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY:  THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND 
ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCE 5 (Markus Schmidt et al. eds. 2009); see also Rob Carlson, 
Synthetic Biology 2.0, Part IV:  What’s in a Name?, SYNTHESIS (May 23, 2006, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.synthesis.cc/2006/05/synthetic-biology-20-part-iv-whats-in-a-name.html.  
Both considerations suggest that it is reasonable to date the field from 2000. 
2 See Daniel G. Gibson et al., Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically 
Synthesized Genome, 329 SCI. 52 (2010) (reporting the design, synthesis, and assembly of the 
Mycoplasma mycoides genome at the Venter Institute). 
3 See infra Part VIII.B (discussing industry standards, including IASB’s Code of 
Conduct). 
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So far so good, but the U.S. federal government was also developing 
its own screening standard.  Observers, including the editors of the 
prestigious science journal Nature, universally assumed that government 
regulation would inevitably be stronger than any private standard.  They 
were wrong.  Instead, HHS overruled the market by announcing non-
binding guidelines that encouraged companies to use fast and cheap 
solutions after all.  Despite criticism, HHS finalized the document—
albeit in slightly watered-down form—in October 2010.4  It is not yet 
clear whether industry will take the hint and retreat from its 
commitment to human screening.5 
Anyone who claims to take biosecurity seriously—and many 
scholars do6—should be thoroughly alarmed by this result.  Following 
ten years of debate, the federal government has announced a policy that 
requires companies to spend almost nothing on screening.  Worse, the 
government has overruled a significantly higher private standard to 
reach this result.  This strongly suggests that the U.S. government is 
more allergic to regulation than industry itself.  Were synthetic biology’s 
security discussions a charade from the beginning?  And what, if 
anything, should we expect in the future? 
Clearly, it is time to take stock.  This Article reviews synthetic 
biology’s decade-long quest to invent and implement meaningful 
security measures and asks what, if anything, can be done to re-start its 
agenda.  Part II provides a short history of synthetic biology and the 
economic forces that have driven it for the past decade.  Part III discusses 
the various pressures that persuaded synthetic biologists and 
government regulators to promise improved biosecurity after 9/11.  Part 
IV addresses and rejects the familiar argument that science is so 
unpredictable that any attempt to regulate synthetic biology is a fool’s 
errand.  Parts V through VIII review synthetic biologists’ decade-long 
debate over security.  Subtopics include proposals for managing so-
called “experiments of concern” that could make biological weapons 
more powerful and easier to make (Part V), the debate over ideas for 
                                                 
4 Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA, 75 
Fed. Reg. 62,820 (Oct. 13, 2010). 
5 See supra Part VIII.C–D (discussing government regulation of screening). 
6 There is now extensive scholarly literature arguing that genetically engineered 
weapons pose realistic threats to American society.  See, e.g., George W. Rutherford & 
Stephen M. Maurer, The New Bioweapons:  Infectious and Engineered Diseases, in WMD 
TERRORISM:  SCIENCE AND POLICY CHOICES 111, 128–38 (Stephen M. Maurer ed. 2009).  By 
comparison, skeptics have been few and far between.  For a rare counterexample, see 
MILTON LEITENBERG, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., ASSESSING THE 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT (2005) (suggesting that terrorists’ ability 
to create genetically engineered weapons has been overstated). 
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keeping synthetic biology’s existing capabilities, especially synthetic 
DNA, away from terrorists (Parts VI and VII), and the ultimately 
disappointing efforts of academic scientists, industry executives, and 
government regulators to turn these ideas into concrete action (Part VIII).  
Part IX reviews the prospects for further action at the start of synthetic 
biology’s second decade.  Part X asks what synthetic biologists, many of 
whom care deeply about security, can do to accelerate reform.  Finally, 
Part XI provides a brief conclusion. 
II.  A SHORT HISTORY OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
Scientists may soon look back on the genetic engineering of the 1990s 
with the same nostalgia that most of us reserve for wood-and-canvas 
biplanes.  Just fifteen years ago, genetic engineering meant cutting and 
pasting DNA from different organisms.  This limited engineers to 
whatever organisms existed in nature, or more precisely, whatever 
organisms they could get their hands on. 
Help was on the way.  Academic scientists had been learning how to 
create synthetic DNA molecules encoding arbitrary gene sequences since 
the 1970s.7  For many years, their progress was so slow that gene-length 
artificial DNA remained a curiosity.  At the same time, each year saw a 
little more automation and affordability.  By century’s end, prices had 
fallen to about five dollars per base pair.8  This turned out to be a tipping 
point.  Soon, scientists realized that they could perform some complex 
experiments more cheaply by replacing traditional cloning methods with 
synthetic DNA. This in turn created a virtuous cycle.  Companies could 
now specialize in producing bulk DNA and invest the profits in better 
production processes.  This led to even lower prices, more demand, and 
still more investment.  A decade later, this process is only now reaching 
its technological limits.  In the meantime, DNA prices have fallen by an 
order of magnitude and are hovering at roughly fifty cents per base 
pair.9 
Cheap commercial DNA opened the door to large numbers of 
previously unaffordable experiments.  Increasingly, these experiments 
were qualitatively different from what had come before.  Suddenly, 
scientists could use synthetic DNA to write arbitrary DNA sequences 
                                                 
7 Har G. Khorana, Total Synthesis of a Gene, 203 SCI. 614 (1979). 
8 See generally Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 1−5 (discussing the falling synthetic DNA 
prices).  DNA’s famous double helix consists of two strands linked together by molecules 
called “base pairs.”  Living things use the order in which different base pairs follow each 
other to encode genetic information.  Synthetic genes typically include thousands or tens of 
thousands of base pairs. 
9 Id. 
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that had never existed in nature.  But why should those DNA 
“blueprints” actually work?  Here, researchers took a page from 
engineering by identifying short, well-behaved snippets of DNA 
(“standard biological parts”) that could be mixed and matched to make 
more complicated designs.  This was more or less the same strategy that 
inventors had used to manage complex design problems since Samuel 
Colt opened his firearms business in the 1830s.10  Still, there were no 
guarantees.  In particular, nobody knew how much new DNA could be 
packed into an organism without killing it.  In 2004, University of 
California, Berkeley Professor Jay Keasling’s Amyris Corporation 
persuaded the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to invest forty-two 
million dollars in designing an organism that could make a molecule 
used in malaria drugs.11  Despite its complexity, Keasling’s design 
succeeded admirably.  This persuaded the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”) and venture capitalists to invest even more in the new 
technology and produced a second virtuous cycle, this time in funding. 
This is where things stood in May 2010 when the J. Craig Venter 
Institute (“JCVI”) announced that it had created an entire artificial 
genome and used it to control a living, self-replicating bacterium.12  
Some dismiss this announcement as an essentially arbitrary Edmund 
Hillary (“Because it’s there”) moment.  In this view, JCVI’s feat lay, at 
most, in making a DNA molecule that was longer and had fewer errors 
than any previous experiment.13  But commentators who argued that 
                                                 
10 Samuel Colt famously introduced standard parts to American industry.  On the use of 
standard biological parts to control complexity, see Jason R. Kelly et al., Measuring the 
Activity of BioBrick Promoters Using an In Vivo Reference Standard, J. BIOMEDICAL 
ENGINEERING, March 2009, http://www.jbioleng.org/content/pdf/1754-1611-3-4.pdf. 
11 Randall Osborne, Amyris Gets $12 Million to Help in Bill Gates’ Malaria Effort, 
BIOWORLD (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.bioworld.com/servlet/com.accumedia.web. 
Dispatcher?next=bioWorldHeadlines_article&forceid=34262. 
12 Press Release, J. Craig Venter Inst., First Self-Replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell (May, 
20, 2010), http://www.jcvi.org/cms/press/press-releases/full-text/article/first-self-
replicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell-constructed-by-j-craig-venter-institute-researcher/. 
13 Professors Cho and Relman emphasize that the creation of an entire bacterial genome, 
though “noteworthy,” reflects “incremental” past advances and is “primarily a matter of 
scale.”  Mildred K. Cho & David A. Relman, Synthetic “Life,” Ethics, National Security and 
Public Discourse, 329 SCI. 38, 38 (2010).  Similarly, the Presidential Commission for the Study 
of Bioethical Issues has emphasized that  
[t]he [JCVI] announcement last May, although extraordinary in many 
ways, does not amount to creating life as either a scientific or a moral 
matter.  The scientific evidence before the Commission showed that 
the research relied on an existing natural host . . . . [and] does not 
represent the creation of life from inorganic chemicals alone. 
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS:  THE ETHICS 
OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
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JCVI’s Mycoplasma mycoides was a straight copy of nature’s design may 
have missed the point.  This is because the same techniques can now be 
used to create special “chassis organisms” with deliberately small 
genomes that leave maximal room for standard biological parts.  If so, 
we may be on the brink of synthetic biology’s third virtuous cycle.  
Today, synthetic biologists insert standard parts into many different 
organisms.  This makes it hard for them to share data and, in particular, 
to know when a design’s failure is caused by the host.  The rise of chassis 
organisms, on the other hand, will encourage researchers to converge on 
a relatively small number of shared organisms.  Microbiologists have 
known since the 1950s that research communities built around “model 
organisms” find it easier to share data and are much more productive.14  
JCVI’s achievement promises to similarly accelerate synthetic biology. 
It is hard not to see these advances as good news.  At the same time, 
science is neither moral nor immoral.  State programs have perverted 
classical biology to develop weapons since the 1940s.15  More recently, 
Soviet scientists worked hard to develop genetically engineered weapons 
in the 1970s and 1980s16  Given this history, it was only natural to worry 
that synthetic biology methods would also be abused. 
The simplest threat was economic:  the Soviet program had cost far 
more than any terrorist could afford.  Synthetic DNA made many of 
these experiments cheaper than they were before.  More ambitiously, 
synthetic biology meant that researchers were no longer limited to 
pathogens they already possessed or could borrow from colleagues.  
                                                                                                             
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.bioethics.gov/documents/synthetic-
biology/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-Report-12.16.10.pdf. 
14 Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, Network Effects in Biology R&D, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 159, 159 (2010). 
15 The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Japan all conducted large-scale 
biological weapons programs during World War II.  Except for Japan, most of these 
programs continued into the 1960s.  Uniquely, the Soviet Union continued to pursue 
biological weapons into the 1990s.  Unlike earlier Western programs, this work fully 
exploited the then-new science of genetic engineering.  See, e.g., DEADLY CULTURES:  
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SINCE 1945 (Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa & Malcolm Dando eds., 
2006) (discussing the various use of biological weapons programs throughout the world); 
JEANNE GUILLEMIN, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FROM THE INVENTION OF STATE-SPONSORED 
PROGRAMS TO CONTEMPORARY BIOTERRORISM (2005) (examining biological weapon use in 
the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Soviet Union). 
16 For the classic account, see KEN ALIBEK & STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAZARD:  THE 
CHILLING TRUE STORY OF THE LARGEST COVERT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM IN THE 
WORLD—TOLD FROM THE INSIDE BY THE MAN WHO RAN IT (1999).  Some American 
scientists have expressed quiet skepticism about Alibek’s claims.  See, e.g., Richard W. 
Titball, An Elusive Serial Killer, 430 NATURE 145, 145 (2004) (pointing out the skepticism of 
American scientists interviewed for Wendy Orent’s 2004 book entitled Plague:  The 
Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World’s Most Dangerous Disease).  In fairness, 
Alibek himself admits that his most spectacular claims are based on inference. 
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Instead, workers who wanted particular viruses (and eventually 
bacteria) could build them from scratch.  And this included really 
dangerous organisms—most notably, smallpox—that only exist in 
heavily guarded government laboratories.  Indeed, researchers had 
already resurrected two viruses—1918 influenza and polio—that were 
formerly extinct.17  Could smallpox be far behind?  Finally, synthetic 
biology promised to make machine-like organisms unlike anything 
found in nature.  At least in principle, could similar technologies be used 
to make so-called “advanced weapons” that targeted, say, certain ethnic 
groups while ignoring others?18 
III.  THE PRESSURE BUILDS 
Synthetic biologists have always known that their technology poses 
security risks.  Indeed, biologists have debated claims that genetic 
engineering could create epidemics since the mid-1970s.19  These 
concerns happened to be particularly prominent at the time synthetic 
biology was born.  In 1998, Richard Preston published The Cobra Event,20 
a novel in which terrorists used genetic engineering to create a super-
virus.  Many readers—including then-President Bill Clinton21—found 
the book chillingly credible, especially because Preston had written 
extensively about real-life biological weapons.  The following year, 
defector Ken Alibek wrote an even bigger best-seller claiming that the 
Russian military had created genetically engineered weapons unlike 
anything found in nature.22  These bestsellers were followed by a 
renewed scholarly interest in so-called advanced weapons.23  News that 
                                                 
17 See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
18 For a survey of possibilities, see Rutherford & Maurer, supra note 6. 
19 SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR POLITICS:  DEVELOPING AMERICAN AND BRITISH 
REGULATORY POLICY FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING, 1972–82 passim (1994). 
20 RICHARD PRESTON, THE COBRA EVENT (1997). 
21 Margo Nash, Where Terrorism Meets Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, 
www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/nyregion/in-person-where-terrorism-meets-optimism. 
html (reporting that President Clinton “asked the F.B.I. to determine whether the events 
described in ‘The Cobra Event’ could really happen”). 
22 See ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 16.  
23 See, e.g., Steven M. Block, Living Nightmares:  Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular 
Biology, in THE NEW TERROR:  FACING THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
39–75 (Sidney D. Drell et al. eds. 1999); RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S 
ACHILLES’ HEEL:  NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK 
(4th prtg. 2001). 
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an Australian team had discovered a way to help pox viruses evade 
vaccines added to these concerns in the months before 9/11.24 
Given this background, it was natural for synthetic biologists to ask 
whether their field posed any special concerns.  Indeed, one group 
discussed the fact that their laboratory could now synthesize, though not 
assemble, pox virus DNA as early as 1999.  Despite this, no very detailed 
or practical discussions seem to have taken place until 2002−2003.25 
By then, a great deal had changed.  First and foremost was 9/11 and 
the Amerithrax attacks that followed two months later.  Suddenly, many 
officials, including the President, believed that a biological weapons 
attack was imminent or even underway.26  This crisis atmosphere 
predictably led to various Executive Branch responses.  These ranged 
from pressing researchers to suppress certain experimental results27 to 
opening new dialogues with academic scientists.  By 2002−2003, a wide 
variety of biosecurity experts including governmental staff and advisors 
were asking synthetic biologists to identify security threats and think 
about possible solutions.28  Meanwhile, Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act, which inter alia made it a crime to possess biological 
agents, toxins, or delivery systems.29  Subsequently, the Agricultural 
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 required people possessing Select 
Agent organisms30 to undergo background checks and register with 
                                                 
24 Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia 
Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Response and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox, 
75 J. VIROLOGY 1205 (2001). 
25 E-mail from Drew Endy to author (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:01 PST) [hereinafter Endy E-mail] 
(on file with author); accord Robert F. Service, Synthetic Biologists Debate Policing Themselves, 
312 SCI. 1116, 1116 (2006) (stating that synthetic biologists started to consult ethicists and 
launch studies in 2004). 
26 See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 152–53 (2010) (recounting post-9/11 fears 
that the White House had been contaminated with botulinum toxin). 
27 See infra Part V.A. 
28 E-mail from Robert Carlson, Principal, Biodesic to author (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:07 PST) 
[hereinafter Carlson E-mail] (on file with author); E-mail from Andrew Ellington to author 
(Mar. 1, 2011, 11:04 CST) (on file with author); Endy E-mail, supra note 25; see also Drew 
Endy, Strategy for Biological Risk and Security (Oct. 2003) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/30595. 
29 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 817, 115 Stat. 272, 385−86 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175 
(2006)); see also Select Agents and Toxins, 42 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2010) (implementing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 175 by, inter alia, publishing the list of select agents and toxins).  The Act contained an 
exception for “prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose[s]”.  
Pub. L. No. § 817(1)(C), 115 Stat. at 385−86 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175(b)).  The bill also 
made it a crime for illegal aliens and citizens of certain countries to possess, transport, or 
receive organisms found on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Select Agent 
list.  Id. § 817(2), 115 Stat. at 385−86 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175b (2006)). 
30 Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2010) 
(implementing provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act and listing agents 
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HHS.31  These laws were immediately interpreted to include DNA 
molecules encoding sequences found in Select Agent organisms.  
However, the application of these laws to short and/or non-identical 
variant sequences remained unclear. 
A. Synthetic Biology Controversies 
The new laws re-focused commercial gene-makers’ attention on 
security.  They, in turn, introduced the issue to academic scientists.32  At 
this point, an intense debate was more or less inevitable. In part, this 
reflected synthetic biology’s status as a new and highly publicized 
discipline. However, there were more specific reasons as well.  In 2002, 
Professor Eckhard Wimmer used artificial DNA to make the world’s first 
artificial polio virus.33  Though widely criticized,34 Wimmer defended his 
work as a deliberate wake-up call for scientists and society alike.  
Thereafter, activists35 and a second incident in which researchers 
resurrected the 1918 influenza virus36 kept the issue alive.  In 2005, New 
Scientist magazine added still more fuel to the fire by reporting that at 
                                                                                                             
and toxins that “have the potential to pose a severe threat to plant health or plant 
products”); Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 9 C.F.R. pt. 121 
(2010) (implementing provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act and listing 
agents and toxins that “have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and 
safety, to animal health, or to animal products”). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 262a(d); see also 7 C.F.R. § 331.7 (requiring the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to develop registration and inspection measures for facilities that handle 
enumerated plant and animal pathogens). 
32 Endy E-mail, supra note 25; cf. Alan Pearson, Ctr. for Arms Control & 
Nonproliferation:  Scientists Working Grp. on Biological & Chemical Weapons, 
Establishing a Responsible Biosciences Forum 6 (Jan. 26, 2007) (unpublished report) (on file 
with author) (“Similarly, a concern among DNA synthesis companies that they could be 
held legally liable for even unwittingly enabling illegal activity is generating attention to 
issues of misuse and responsible conduct within the synthetic biology community.”). 
33 Jeronimo Cello et al., Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA:  Generation of Infectious 
Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, 297 SCI. 1016, 1016−18 (2002) (describing Wimmer’s 
research results). 
34 John D. Steinbruner & Elisa D. Harris, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH., Spring 2003, available at http://www.issues.org/19.3/steinbruner.htm.  Perhaps the 
highest profile criticism came from Craig Venter, who called the work “irresponsible” and 
called for new procedures to review similar experiments in the future.  Id.  University of 
Pennsylvania ethicist Arthur Caplan joined in Venter’s call for oversight.  Id. 
35 Activists at the Sunshine Project warned against synthetic pathogens in November 
2003.  Dirk Stemerding et al., Synthetic Biology and the Role of Civil Society Organizations 
Shaping the Agenda and Arena of the Public Debate, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 155, 
157. 
36 Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza 
Pandemic Virus, 310 SCI. 77 (2005). 
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least one gene-maker made no effort to screen incoming customer 
orders.37 
B. Promising Action 
In the post-9/11 environment, simply identifying threats and 
possible responses was no longer enough.  However tentatively, 
biologists began to talk about action.  The earliest and most influential 
suggestion came from the National Academy of Science’s Fink 
Committee.38  It urged the Bush Administration to create a new National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (“NSABB”) to propose 
regulations that the government could implement.  Given post-9/11 
politics, the Bush Administration could hardly refuse: it created the 
NSABB in April 2004.39  This, in turn, established a clear expectation that 
the NSABB—and the federal government itself—would eventually take 
formal action, although how much action remained unclear.40 
So far, these responses were fairly conventional.  However, many 
synthetic biologists see themselves as the heirs to computer science and 
the electronics industry.  This made it natural to ask whether self-
governance could grow out of the community’s recurring “Synthetic 
Biology” or “SB” conferences in the same way that Web self-governance 
had grown out of the electronics community’s “W3C” conferences.41  
                                                 
37 Peter Aldhous, The Bioweapon Is in the Post, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 8.  The 
article reported that nine of twelve DNA makers contacted failed to examine incoming 
orders on a regular basis.  Id.  However, this figure was somewhat misleading because only 
one of the non-screeners was a gene-maker.  The rest specialized in making shorter 
molecules called “oligos.”  Id.  Screening short sequences produces large numbers of false 
alarms and remains challenging even today.  Id.  The Guardian newspaper later published a 
similar expose in which reporters purchased short segments of smallpox DNA from three 
U.K. companies.  James Randerson, Lax Laws, Virus DNA and Potential for Terror, 
GUARDIAN, June 14, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2006/jun/14/weapons 
technology.uk/print (U.K.). 
38 COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE 
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT]. 
39 Kerry Boyd-Anderson, U.S. Creates Advisory Board for Biosecurity, ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N (April 2004), http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1513. 
40 The Fink Committee may also have thought that the NSABB would give government 
bureaucrats political cover by making strong, specific recommendations.  This is, after all, a 
common Beltway political tactic.  See, e.g., David Wessel, Panel on Cutting Deficit Paves Way 
for Politicians, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011, at A4 (recounting how the Deficit Reduction 
Commission was established to give Washington insiders cover to cut entitlements and 
other spending).  If so, they were disappointed.  NSABB’s eventual recommendations were 
much too vague to serve this purpose.  See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
41 See TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB:  THE ORIGINAL DESIGN 
AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (2000), for a first-hand 
description of W3C and Web governance.  The analogy between Web governance and 
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Here, the fact that the SB1.0 conference had already hosted the 
community’s first public discussion of security issues in 2004 was clearly 
encouraging.42  This immediately led to expectations that the SB2.0 
conference scheduled for May 2006 would take concrete actions.43 
By late 2005, both the public and academic sectors had committed 
themselves, however vaguely, to the principle of action.  Not 
surprisingly, the first fruits were a renewed emphasis on collecting—and 
if possible, building consensus around—security measures that had 
already been proposed.  On its face, it was naïve to think that two 
hundred synthetic biologists could produce meaningful consensus, let 
alone action, in the space of a three-hour meeting.  On the other hand, 
SB2.0’s failure to act would trigger a cycle of disappointment and low 
expectations for every SB conference thereafter.  In order to prevent this 
outcome, the Carnegie Corporation of New York and MacArthur 
Foundations funded a University of California, Berkeley project to help 
community members identify and develop proposals in advance of the 
meeting.44 
By then, the Sloan Foundation had already funded its own $570,000, 
fifteen-month program to develop options—though not formal 
recommendations—for policymakers to consider.45  Because most of 
these options required government regulation, the Sloan study 
                                                                                                             
synthetic biology was never very exact.  This was because the Web could not move 
forward—indeed, could not exist—without some minimal set of standards.  For this reason, 
failure to adopt standards would doom the entire enterprise.  By comparison, academic 
and commercial synthetic biologists could continue practicing their trades with or without 
biosecurity standards.  This made synthetic biology’s self-governance problem much 
harder than the Web’s.  The extent to which synthetic biologists in academia and especially 
industry managed to overcome this inertia is remarkable. 
42 See Service, supra note 25, at 1116 (remarking that SB1.0 moved security issues “to the 
forefront”); Robert Carlson, Synthetic Biology 1.0, FUTUREBRIEF (2005), 
http://www.futurebrief.com/robertcarlsonbio.pdf.  Carlson remarks that members were 
moved both by the actual threat and by “the potential public backlash it may incite.”  Id. 
43 See Carlson, supra note 42 (“Synthetic Biology 2.0 is scheduled for June of 2006.  We 
have an enormous amount of work to do before then.”); see also George Church, Let Us Go 
Forth and Safely Multiply, 438 NATURE 423, 423 (2005) (expressing confidence that SB2.0 
meeting “should make significant progress” toward a code of conduct). 
44 The author served as principal investigator. 
45 Elizabeth Pennisi, Synthetic Biology Remakes Small Genomes, 310 SCI. 769, 770 (2005); 
Craig Venter Institute Release:  Major New Policy Study Will Explore Risks, Benefits of Synthetic 
Genomics, BIOSPACE (June 28, 2005), http://www.biospace.com/news_story.aspx?News 
EntityId=20467320.  The report ultimately took twenty months and included reports from a 
core group of fourteen experts.  The centerpiece of the effort included three invitation-only 
meetings—an ironic procedure in a project designed to build public trust—several 
commissioned studies, and a final report.  MICHELE GARFINKEL ET AL., SYNTHETIC 
GENOMICS:  OPTIONS FOR GOVERNANCE, at i (2007), available at http://www.synbiosafe.eu/ 
uploads/pdf/Synthetic%20Genomics%20Options%20for%20Governance.pdf. 
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considered a much broader range of issues than members could address 
at SB2.0.  At the same time, the project would not be completed until 
2007—long after SB2.0 ended.  While this did not preclude community 
action at SB2.0, it almost certainly made it seem less urgent.46  The main 
point as of early 2006, however, was that the community had committed 
itself to pursuing both private and public security initiatives.  It 
remained to be seen whether either track would deliver meaningful 
results. 
IV.  IS BIOSECURITY POSSIBLE? 
Anyone who listens to synthetic biologists debate security sooner or 
later will hear the claim that science moves too quickly to be regulated.47  
This argument surely deserves to be taken seriously.  At the same time, it 
is good to be suspicious.  As Herman Kahn pointed out fifty years ago, 
many people find the idea that a problem is hopeless strangely 
comforting because it makes hard choices unnecessary.48  Clearly, there 
is no way to know for certain whether synthetic biology can be 
regulated.  That said, it is important to try.  Part IV.A addresses common 
assertions that existing synthetic biology technologies are, or soon will 
be, uncontrollable.  Part IV.B tackles the harder question of whether 
science will inevitably produce new weapons of mass destruction 
(“WMD”) technologies faster than policymakers can regulate them. 
A. Controlling Existing Technologies 
As already discussed, the synthetic biology revolution depends on 
access to cheap commercial DNA.  Regulating commercial sources will 
not work, however, if the same DNA can be readily obtained from other 
                                                 
46 The European Commission funded a €235,000 counterpart to the 
Carnegie/MacArthur and Sloan projects in 2006.  Unlike the American projects, 
SYNBIOSAFE was billed as a fact-finding exercise and exploration instead of a call to 
action.  However, it too sought to identify something like a consensus around threats and 
eventual action.  Huib de Vriend, Constructing Life:  Early Social Reflections on the Emerging 
Field of Synthetic Biology (The Hague:  Rathenau Inst., Working Doc. No. 97, 2006), available 
at http://depot.knaw.nl/4935/1/WED97_Constructing_Life_2006.pdf; Safety and Ethical 
Aspects of Synthetic Biology, SYNBIOSAFE, http://www.synbiosafe.eu/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2011). 
47 Indeed, one survey of synthetic biologists has claimed “a consensus developing 
initially, according to which effective oversight of biology and protection from a 
biochemical catastrophe were impossible,” so that any kind of central regulation “would be 
useless.”  Markus Schmidt et al., SYNBIOSAFE E-conference:  Online Community Discussion 
on the Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology, 2 SYSTEMS & SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 7, 13 (2008). 
48 HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE (1962). 
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sources.  In practice, there are at least three variants of this argument.  It 
is surprisingly easy to marshal evidence for each of them. 
First, skeptics like to say that genes can be made by undergraduates 
or even high school students.49  However, this statement is only true in 
principle.  In practice, even bright non-specialists make so many 
mistakes that success would take many years.50 
Second, some commentators argue that many academic and 
corporate labs already make genes.  However, this ignores the fact that 
such work is almost always done for internal use or known customers.  
This implies that terrorists who try to obtain DNA from these sources 
will incur substantial—and often unacceptable—security risks. 
Historically, terrorist plots have frequently unraveled because 
companies reported unusual inquiries to authorities.51 
Third, some synthetic biologists have argued that the complex skills 
needed to make genes will soon be replaced by easy-to-use tabletop 
synthesizers.  Economically, this amounts to a bet that synthesizer 
technology will eventually become competitive with specialized workers 
operating in massive central facilities.  No one can be sure whether this 
will happen.  That said, it is worth pointing out that gene synthesis 
companies continue to make massive investments in plants and 
equipment.  This implies a market judgment that tabletop devices are not 
imminent.52 
In addition to the foregoing technical objections, synthetic biologists 
sometimes advance various social or economic arguments that 
regulation is futile.  For example, many synthetic biologists argue that 
even skills that are scarce—and hence regulable—today will inevitably 
become ubiquitous over time.  This, however, ignores history.  Indeed, 
some key biotech skills are markedly less common than they used to be.  
During the 1990s, many universities made oligos in-house.  Today, 
however, most of these facilities no longer exist.  Instead, researchers 
find it cheaper and more convenient to buy oligos on the open market.53  
This example shows that private skills can and do atrophy in the face of 
                                                 
49 Mike May, Seeking Security for Synthetic Genes, SCI. AM. WORLDVIEW, 
http://www.saworldview.com/article/seeking-security-for-synthetic-genes (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2011) (“You can put all the guidelines you want on industry, but if ‘Mr. Evil’ wants 
to do something stupid, he can make it in a high school lab.” (quoting Claes Gustafsson, 
DNA2.0’s vice president of sales and marketing)). 
50 Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 3 n.10. 
51 Probably the most famous is white supremacist Larry Wayne Harris’s attempt to 
obtain plague from a commercial repository. 
52 The fact that at least one company has tried to develop a tabletop synthesizer and 
abandoned the effort as commercially impractical is also instructive.  Maurer et al., supra 
note 1, at 3 n.9. 
53 GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45, at 4. 
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commercial competition.  The effect is likely to be particularly important 
in synthetic biology, where economies of scale allow large companies to 
synthesize genes much more cheaply than anyone else. 
Similarly, some synthetic biologists claim that strong regulation will 
breed rogue companies that specialize in defying the law.54  This model 
only makes sense, however, if defying the law lets rogue companies 
(a) offer lower prices than the big firms that currently dominate the 
industry, or (b) make a living by selling high-priced DNA to 
undesirables.  In fact, neither proposition is likely.  On the one hand, no 
current or proposed screening standard is remotely expensive enough to 
erase the big firms’ price advantage.  On the other, the “undesirables” 
market is tiny; the prospect of one or two terrorist orders is not nearly 
enough to build a business. 
Finally, some biologists, and even NSABB members,55 worry that 
strong regulation could drive companies into foreign countries beyond 
the reach of U.S. law.  This seems doubtful.  If anything, economies of 
scale promise to increase the big U.S. firms’ price advantage over 
competitors over time.  No current or reasonably foreseeable regulation 
is remotely likely to change this. 
Soon after Hiroshima, Manhattan Project physicist Richard Feynman 
argued that nuclear war was both imminent and inevitable.  Sixty-five 
years later, this prediction remains spectacularly wrong.56  It turns out 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Rob Carlson, Tracking the Spread of Biological Technologies, BULL. ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/tracking-
the-spread-of-biological-technologies.  Carlson argues that strong regulation will breed 
rogue gene-makers in the same way that the drug laws have bred illegal 
methamphetamine labs.  Id.  The analogy is doubtful.  Criminals invest enormous time and 
effort learning to make methamphetamines because the illegal market is huge.  By 
comparison, terrorists trying to obtain smallpox would presumably submit a single order.  
This is not nearly enough to support a business. 
55 See, e.g., Meredith Wadman, U.S. Drafts Guidelines to Screen Genes, NATURENEWS (Dec. 
4, 2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091204/full/news.2009.1117.html (“If we 
deter too much, the gene-synthesis industry will go outside the US and outside our 
purview, and it will come back to haunt us.” (quoting NSABB Board member Stuart Levy)). 
56 Decades later, Feynman marveled at how wrong he had been: 
I can’t understand it anymore, but I felt very strongly then. I sat in a 
restaurant in New York, for example, and I started to look out at the 
buildings, and I began to think about how much the radius of the 
Hiroshima bomb damage was . . . . And I would go along and see 
people building a bridge, or they would be [building] a new road and I 
thought, they’re crazy, they just don’t understand. Why are they 
[building] new things? It’s so useless. But, fortunately, it has been 
useless for [so many] years, hasn’t it?  So I’ve been wrong about it 
being useless to [build] bridges and I’m glad that those other people 
had the sense to go ahead. 
Maurer: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End? Synthetic Biology's
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
1402 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
that it is not enough to know that atomic bombs are possible; difficulty 
also matters.  Synthetic biologists should do more than point out that it is 
possible to evade regulation.  They should also bear the burden of 
showing that such evasions are plausibly within terrorists’ existing skill 
sets.  Absent this showing, we should assume that regulation will be at 
least partly effective and move forward. 
B. Predicting WMD Breakthroughs 
Commentators often claim that science is inherently un-regulable 
because (a) discoveries are frequently unexpected, and (b) policymakers 
cannot control what they cannot predict.  This section discusses whether 
the historical record justifies this assertion.  We begin by presenting short 
case histories of how today’s main WMD technologies were developed.  
These histories strongly suggest that policymakers could have foreseen 
most, though not all, of today’s WMD threats in time to take meaningful 
action. 
Case 1:  Atomic Weapons.  The discovery of radioactive decay and, 
soon after, the realization that the atomic nucleus contained enormous 
power was an unexpected result of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century physics research.57  This development could not reasonably have 
been foreseen or controlled by policymakers.  For this reason, there was 
little or nothing they could do to suppress the concept of atomic bombs.58  
At the same time, no one knew how to release nuclear energy until 
academic researchers unexpectedly discovered the “chain reaction” 
principle, and two concrete strategies for implementing it, thirty years 
later.59  Policymakers could easily have defunded the massive academic 
research programs that led to this result.  Once chain reactions were 
discovered, however, nuclear weapons became a well-defined 
engineering problem.  At this point, policymakers could do little to 
                                                                                                             
JAGDISH MEHRA, THE BEAT OF A DIFFERENT DRUM:  THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF RICHARD 
FEYNMAN 160 (1994) (quoting Richard P. Feynman, Los Alamos from Below, ENGINEERING & 
SCI., Jan./Feb. 1976, at 11, 30). 
57 See ABRAHAM PAIS, INWARD BOUND:  OF MATTER AND FORCES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD 
7−12 (1986) (describing nuclear research's origins in, inter alia, vacuum technology, 
spectroscopy, and electromagnetism research). 
58 The popular press speculated extensively about both nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy after radioactive decay was discovered in 1903.  See, e.g., SPENCER R. WEART, 
NUCLEAR FEAR:  A HISTORY OF IMAGES 18 (1988).  H.G. Wells wrote a novel exploring 
atomic bombs and related arms control issues shortly before World War I.  H. G. WELLS, 
THE WORLD SET FREE (Hogarth Press 1988) (1914). 
59 RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (1986). 
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prevent some government, somewhere, from developing atomic60 and, 
eventually, hydrogen weapons.61 
Case 2:  Radiological Weapons.  The health effects of radioactivity were 
discovered accidentally62 and could not have been foreseen by 
policymakers.  For a long time, however, radioactive isotopes were too 
scarce for practical use as WMD.63  As with nuclear weapons, the turning 
point came three decades later with the discovery of chain reactions.  In 
principle, policymakers could have defunded this research.  Once 
scientists invented nuclear reactors, however, there was little 
policymakers could do to prevent some government, somewhere, from 
developing radiological WMDs.  Strangely, no government seems to 
have done this.  While the United States pursued radiological weapons 
in the early 1950s, the program was soon abandoned so that, uniquely, 
this particular form of WMD was never deployed.64 
Case 3: Chemical Weapons.  Policymakers were deeply concerned by 
the rise of the chemical industry and its facilities for making poison gas 
by the late 1890s.65  At the same time, normal industrial chemicals, such 
as chlorine, had only limited toxicity.  This meant that their WMD 
potential was marginal.  In principle, therefore, policymakers could have 
usefully delayed the development of more capable weapons by signing 
treaties that prevented governments from developing improved poisons.  
In practice, however, such treaties would have been hard to verify and 
would almost certainly have been ignored (like other weapons treaties) 
once World War I began.  Even so, wartime progress was limited.  
Despite massive funding, government research and development 
                                                 
60 Some have argued that only the U.S. government was rich enough to fund atomic 
weapons, and then only under the extreme conditions of World War II.  This assertion is 
obviously not testable. 
61 Research leading to fusion weapons (the hydrogen bomb) followed a similar 
trajectory.  RICHARD RHODES, DARK SUN:  THE MAKING OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB (1995). 
62 See PAIS, supra note 57, at 93−100 (describing the tragic early history of academic and 
industrial exposure to radioactivity). 
63 The dirty bombs envisaged by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and others 
since 9/11 would almost certainly cause very few casualties.  Instead, their effects, if any, 
would be mostly psychological.  Many experts privately point out that dirty bombs should 
not be considered WMDs at all, except somewhat sarcastically as “Weapons of Mass 
Disruption.” 
64 See Will Grover, All the Easy Experiments:  A Berkeley Professor, Dirty Bombs, and the 
Birth of Informed Consent, BERKELEY SCI. REV., Fall 2005, at 41–45 (discussing radiological 
warfare research in the 1940s). 
65 The first treaty against gas warfare was signed in 1899.  Declaration on the Use of 
Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, 
Hague Peace Conference of 1899, July 29, 1899, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
19th_century/dec99-02.asp. 
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(“R&D”) programs only improved toxicity by a factor of thirty.66  This 
improvement was miniscule compared to what commercial pesticide 
companies, whose R&D programs were supported by large markets over 
a period of decades, were able to accomplish after the War. By the mid-
1930s, Hitler’s Germany had exploited these discoveries to make 
weapons that were 2,500 times more toxic than chlorine.67  Policymakers 
could have blocked this advance by making improved pesticides illegal.  
Such a ban would have immediately defunded commercial discovery 
programs in a simple and above all publicly verifiable way. 
Case 4:  Biological Weapons—Contagious Diseases.  The idea of using 
contagious diseases as weapons has been known for centuries.  In the 
modern world, however, smallpox is almost certainly the only pathogen 
capable of inflicting large-scale casualties.68  The idea that terrorists could 
deliberately infect themselves to spread the disease was already widely 
known at the start of the twentieth century.69  Policymakers could have 
done little to stop a determined government, and perhaps terrorists, 
from acquiring the pathogen and sending out human carriers to spread 
the disease.70 
Case 5:  Biological Weapons—Anthrax.  To work as weapons, 
pathogens that do not rely on human-to-human transmission must be 
able to survive for long periods on surfaces and the open air.  This 
property is rare:  among natural agents, only anthrax spores are 
simultaneously hardy and virulent enough to make useful weapons.  
Policymakers could do little to suppress this knowledge, which was 
widely discussed before World War II.71  Thereafter, Great Britain was 
able to develop effective anthrax bombs within a year or so while the 
                                                 
66 The English program tested 150,000 chemicals.  A similar American establishment 
tested 4,000 compounds and is said to have been the largest U.S. military R&D effort prior 
to the Manhattan Project.  ROBERT HARRIS & JEREMY PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING:  
THE SECRET STORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 23, 35 (1982). 
67 For a detailed history of how Germany developed its Tabun and Sarin weapons, see 
HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 55−69; and JONATHAN B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERVES:  
WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA 24−39 (2006).  The British government similarly exploited 
postwar pesticide research to achieve an additional three-fold toxicity improvement for its 
VX weapon in the 1950s.  HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 186−87; TUCKER, supra, at 
158. 
68 Rutherford & Maurer, supra at note 6, at 114–15. 
69 See, e.g., H.G. Wells, The Stolen Bacillus, in H.G. WELLS, THE STOLEN BACILLUS AND 
OTHER INCIDENTS 11 (Westholme Publishing 2005) (1895). 
70 Strangely, they can do better today.  The reason is that smallpox has been eradicated 
and no longer exists outside of a handful of heavily guarded laboratories.  This assumes, of 
course, that terrorists cannot use synthetic biology to resurrect the disease. 
71 The most famous use of the idea is found in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, which 
describes what happens after Western civilization collapses under a rain of anthrax bombs.  
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (First Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2010) (1932). 
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United States was well on its way to achieving large-scale production at 
War’s end.72  Policymakers could have done little to stop these 
developments. 
Case 6:  Other Pathogens.  Anthrax apart, potential weapons 
pathogens are much too delicate to survive in the open.  During the 
1940s, government R&D programs learned how to spread pathogens as 
microscopic droplets of special protective liquids called “formulation.”  
However, these wet agents were relatively ineffective.  For this reason, 
modern biological weapons uniformly depend on freeze-drying73 
organisms into a powder.  No policymaker could have anticipated that 
freeze-drying would make organisms hardier when academic scientists 
invented the technique in the 1890s.  At least in principle, however, they 
should have been able to recognize the threat after scientists discovered 
that freeze-dried pathogens could be revived in 1909.74  At this point, 
determined policymakers could have defunded academic efforts to scale 
up the technology to the point where it could be used to make weapons.  
Instead, successive researchers continued to improve the process until it 
reached industrial scales in the mid-1930s.75  At this point, policymakers 
could do little to stop governments from further developing the 
technology.  Government R&D programs duly perfected bulk freeze-
drying for blood plasma during World War II and extended the 
technology to make biological weapons in the 1950s.76 
Case 7: Genetically Engineered Threats.  Biologists’ discovery that 
organisms frequently exchange DNA opened the door to deliberate 
genetic engineering experiments in the 1960s.  No policymaker could 
                                                 
72 HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra at note 66. 
73 I am indebted to my former research assistant, Tania Dutta, for uncovering the history 
of freeze-drying. 
74 See Homer F. Swift, Preservation of Stock Cultures of Bacteria by Freezing and Drying, 33 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL MED. 69 (1921) (reviewing early literature on freeze-drying of bacteria and 
viruses).  This early work also discovered various subsidiary tricks for keeping freeze-dried 
organisms alive (e.g., adding milk or sugar) that were later used by the United States and 
others to manufacture biological weapons in the 1950s.  Bernard W. Hammer, A Note on the 
Vacuum Desiccation of Bacteria, 24 J. MED. RESEARCH 527, 527 (1911) (describing liquid 
solutions containing milk sugar, milk powder, and starch). 
75 Earl W. Flosdorf & Stuart Mudd, Procedure and Apparatus for Preservation in “Lyophile” 
Form of Serum and Other Biological Substances, 29 J. IMMUNOLOGY 389, 392 (1935) (reporting 
development of large-scale freeze-drying equipment and asserting that “[t]here is little 
doubt that [freeze-drying technology] can readily be adapted to full industrial scale 
operation”). 
76 See R.I.N. Greves, Centrifugal Vacuum Freezing:  Its Application to the Drying of Biological 
Materials from the Frozen State, 153 NATURE 485, 485–87 (1944) (discussing wartime freeze-
drying developments and noting “great advances” in large-scale freeze-drying of blood 
products during World War II); Instant Coffee, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Instant_coffee (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
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have foreseen or prevented this development.  Policymakers could, 
however, have stopped the massive commercial R&D programs that 
expanded the technology thereafter.  Absent this groundwork, the Soviet 
Union would have found it difficult, or impossible, to pursue genetically 
engineered weapons in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Surveying our case studies, it is clear that our hypothetical 
regulators would have had little or no chance of blocking the 
development of contagious disease (Case 4) and anthrax weapons (Case 
5).  On the other hand, ruthless intervention to defund academic research 
would have stood an excellent chance of blocking the development of 
atomic (Case 1), radiological (Case 2) and most pathogen weapons (Case 
6).  Similarly, international agreements to limit commercial R&D would 
almost certainly have stopped the development of chemical weapons 
(Case 3).  Finally, combinations of ruthless defunding and limits on 
commercial research could plausibly have prevented the development of 
genetically engineered weapons (Case 7). 
The key word, of course, is “ruthless.”  Historically, real attempts to 
stop WMD have usually focused on treaties to suppress government 
R&D programs after the basic science has been established so that only 
engineering problems remain.  While occasionally effective, such treaties 
are necessarily hard to verify and invite cheating.77  More recently, 
government officials and academics have debated the feasibility of 
stopping individual “experiments of concern” from going forward.78  
Our examples suggest that this is unlikely to be more than a stopgap.  In 
the long arc of academic science, individual experiments will almost 
always be so obvious—and the costs of performing them so modest—
that some scientist, somewhere, is bound to try them.  For this reason, 
suppression is unlikely to work for long.79 
The case would be very different if policymakers were willing to 
suppress commercial and academic research agendas over a period of 
decades.  After all, experiments showing that freeze-dried organisms can 
be revived, or that uranium can be made to support chain reactions, 
                                                 
77 The point is amply documented by the history of chemical weapons treaties, in which 
many countries originally developed new weapons defensively to study possible threats 
and design countermeasures.  See, e.g., HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 43−44, 48−49. 
78 See infra Part V (discussing the experiments of concern problem). 
79 Spencer R. Weart, Scientists with a Secret, PHYSICS TODAY, Feb. 1976, at 23–30.  
Temporary suppression may sometimes be a useful goal.  During the early days of World 
War II, U.S. physicists organized an unofficial conspiracy to keep atomic physics research 
secret.  The effort ultimately helped block Nazi efforts to build a nuclear reactor.  This 
result was only useful, however, because the Allied war effort guaranteed that Nazi 
Germany would build a bomb within five years, or not at all.  Temporary suppression was 
also a more feasible goal because it meant that the conspiracy’s organizers could promise 
authors that their work would eventually be published. 
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were not really serendipitous.  Decades of academic or commercial effort 
were required to reach the point where these experiments could be 
proposed.  Still other breakthrough experiments were unremarkable 
installments in brute force campaigns to find better insecticides or 
document radioactive decays across the periodic table.  The larger point 
is that even the clever experiments would usually have been unthinkable 
had they not been part of much larger and longstanding research 
agendas. 
There are obvious political reasons why such steps have never been 
taken.  Nonetheless, such bans might also have been poor policy.  After 
all, WMD have killed relatively few people80 so far while their 
underlying technologies have delivered significant civilian benefits.81  
Even nuclear energy may yet turn out to be a good thing if it solves the 
world’s energy and greenhouse problems.82  Still, the fact remains that 
these questions could have been asked and action could have been taken.  
Biosecurity policy is possible. 
C. Is Synthetic Biology Special? 
It is always, of course, possible to argue that synthetic biology is 
qualitatively different from earlier dual-use technologies.  In this case, 
                                                 
80 This does not, of course, mean that the risks were worth running ex ante.  Most 
obviously, there were many near-misses that could have led to nuclear war.  See PETER 
VINCENT PRY, WAR SCARE:  RUSSIA AND AMERICA ON THE NUCLEAR BRINK (1999); SCOTT D. 
SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY:  ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(1993).  Any attempt to quantify these risks is necessarily subjective.  However, it is worth 
noting that Soviet Premier Khrushchev privately warned his Politburo that the chances of a 
nuclear war erupting over Berlin in 1961 were about five percent. FREDERICK KEMPE, 
BERLIN 1961 205 (2011). Given the number of people who would die in such an exchange, 
even this five percent probability would have given policymakers a persuasive case for 
suppressing nuclear energy. 
81 For example, the ability to freeze-dry organisms made it possible for biologists to 
trade organisms by mail.  This allowed scientists around the world to conduct experiments 
on the same model organisms, which vastly accelerated research.  See, e.g., SCOTT STERN, 
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS:  KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE SCIENCES 20–22 (2004).  
The discovery of nerve gases is similarly linked to the discovery of DDT, which has saved 
millions of lives since World War II.  See, e.g., Amir Attaran et al., Balancing Risks on the 
Backs of the Poor, 6 NATURE MED. 729, 729–31 (2000). 
82 In a strange way, the recent nuclear accident in Fukujima, Japan actually strengthens 
the case for nuclear power.  Back in the 1950s, it would have been reasonable to say that 
mankind had very little information about how common and/or destructive nuclear 
accidents would be.  Today we have much better data about how often accidents occur 
and, especially, their potential downside.  Pro-nuclear activists are almost certainly correct 
when they say that nuclear power has killed far fewer people than, say, the 100,000 
workers who died mining coal during the twentieth century.  William Tucker, Why I Still 
Support Nuclear Power, Even After Fukushima, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704396904576226820013417298.html. 
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arguments that today’s WMD technologies could have been controlled 
might not matter.  That said, the existing evidence seems to fit the 
historical pattern.  Synthetic biology’s first decade produced two clear 
experiments of concern—synthetic polio and then 1918 influenza—both 
of which were clearly predictable and even routine by the time they were 
performed.83  As in our WMD examples, these results could only have 
been stopped by blocking the relevant academic research agendas 
decades ago.84 
V.  PREVENTING WMD BREAKTHROUGHS:  THE “EXPERIMENTS OF 
CONCERN” PROBLEM 
Part IV argued that society can plausibly control existing WMD 
technologies and sometimes even steer R&D away from dangerous 
topics.  However, we have said little about how such interventions might 
be designed in the case of synthetic biology.  This section reviews efforts 
to steer synthetic biology R&D away from paths that would make 
weapons more powerful and easier to acquire.  In practice, this debate 
has focused almost entirely on identifying and regulating so-called 
“experiments of concern.”  This section will consider efforts to 
discourage and/or censor such experiments.  Parts VI and VII will detail 
the parallel debates over how best to control synthetic biology 
technologies that already exist. 
A. Censoring Results 
Probably the most obvious way to control synthetic biology R&D is 
to suppress dangerous results if and when they are discovered.  Shortly 
after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the White 
House announced that they were developing regulations to control the 
“discussion and publication” of non-classified research that could 
nevertheless affect national security.85  Alarmed, the American Society 
                                                 
83 The decade’s most controversial molecular biology experiment outside synthetic 
biology was almost certainly the demonstration that mousepox could be made more 
virulent. 
84 That said, blocking the experiments might still have delayed the demonstration and 
dissemination of these technologies for a few years.  While it has become fashionable to talk 
of the fight against terrorism as “The Long War,” there is no obvious reason why Al-Qaeda 
could not collapse or at least become drastically less capable within the next decade.  In 
that case, suppressing artificial virus technology for even a few years could still be a useful 
investment. 
85 For further details, see, e.g., Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34, at 5. 
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for Microbiology (“ASM”) asked the U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
(“NAS”) to explore voluntary alternatives.86 
The result was a high-profile national workshop in August 2002.87  
Attendees were evenly divided between security professionals from the 
public and private sectors and academics including research scientists, 
journal editors, and scientific society officials.  The group spent most of 
its time debating a proposal that would have restricted publication for 
six types of research that could be used to turn Select Agents into 
practical weapons.88  However, this proposal failed in the face of 
opposition from universities, journals, and scientists.89  Unable to reach 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Raymond A. Zilinskas & Jonathan B. Tucker, Limiting the Contribution of the Open 
Scientific Literature to the Biological Weapons Threat, J. HOMELAND SECURITY, Dec. 3, 2002, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/tucker.html.  The Workshop on 
Guidelines for the Publication of Scientific Research Potentially Related to Biological and 
Toxin Warfare was held on August 12, 2002 in Washington, D.C.  Id. at n.1. 
88 Id.  Participants at the workshop discussed categories that included research designed 
to: 
 Enhance pathogen infectivity, pathogenicity, antibiotic resistance, 
or resistance to host immunological defenses. 
 Improve the ability of a microbial pathogen to remain viable and 
virulent during prolonged storage and/or after release into the 
environment. 
 Facilitate the dissemination of biological agents as a fine-particle 
aerosol. 
 Facilitate the dissemination of a biological agent by 
contamination of food or water sources. 
 Create a novel pathogen or one with characteristics that have 
been altered to evade current detection methods or host immune 
defenses. 
 Assemble oligonucleotides to synthesize the genome of a 
pathogenic microorganism. 
Id. (numbering omitted). 
89 Id.  Academic scientists reportedly made the following arguments: 
• The proposal appears to establish a system for national 
censorship in which scientific journals would be the guardians of 
the censored material. . . . 
• Research universities and scientific journals would not agree to 
the proposed mechanism. . . . 
• The proposed review process ignores the fact that the intellectual 
knowledge generated under grants (as opposed to contracts) is 
the property of the investigator[s] and that many research 
projects involve students and foreign nationals. . . . 
• Scientists may be unwilling to take on the responsibility of 
reviewing a potentially “sensitive” paper . . . . 
• Scientific journals are not set up to deal with the segregation of 
sensitive data or to provide for secure means of review and 
publication. . . . 
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agreement, the group threw the question back into the academic research 
community’s lap by calling on “bioscientists and their professional 
organizations [to] take the lead in informing security experts how best to 
meet the threats of biological warfare and terrorism” in a way that 
would not unduly harm the scientific enterprise.90 
Government officials renewed the pressure to act at a second NAS 
meeting in January 2003 in which they called on the scientific 
community, and especially journal editors, to “devise a better process” 
for handling unclassified research.91  This time, the statement was 
accompanied by an explicit threat that scientists needed to “come up 
with a process before the public demands the government do it for 
them.”92 
Journal editors responded to this pressure by announcing “that they 
hoped to release a joint statement shortly.”93  The resulting Journal 
Editors Group Statement was duly published on February 21, 2003.94  
The twenty-nine signatories included sixteen past or present editors of 
leading science journals including JAMA, New England Journal of 
Medicine, Nature, and Science.95  Two professional society publishers,96 
                                                                                                             
• Once a document has been designated “Restricted,” it must be 
tracked and its security monitored. . . . 
• . . . The proposed system would impose high legal and 
professional risks on journals, with minimal benefits. 
Id.  Most participants were, however, willing to concede “that under rare circumstances, 
the open communication of unclassified research could pose such a high risk of substantial 
harm as to warrant controlling the distribution of that information.”  Id. 
90 Id. (emphasis added). 
91 Erica Check, US Officials Urge Biologists to Vet Publications for Bioterror Risk, 421 
NATURE 197, 197 (2003). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Journal Editors & Authors Group, Statement on Scientific Publication and Security, 299 
SCIENCE 1149 (2003). 
95 See Journal Editors and Authors Group, SCI., http://www.sciencemag.org/content/299/ 
5610/1149/rel-suppl/46c0b496b5237cd0/suppl/DC1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing 
among the signatories Ronald Atlas, Critical Reviews in Microbiology; Philip Campbell, 
Nature; Nicholas R. Cozzarelli, PNAS; Greg Curfman, New England Journal of Medicine; Lynn 
Enquist, Journal of Virology; Annette Flanagin, Journal of the American Medical Association; 
Gordon Hammes, Biochemistry; Donald Kennedy, Science; Emilie Marcus, Neuron; Alison 
O’Brien, Infection and Immunity; Andrew Onderdonk, Journal of Clinical Microbiology; 
Beatrice Renault, Nature Medicine; Robert Rich, Journal of Immunology; Thomas Shenk, 
Journal of Virology; Herbert Tabor, Journal of Biological Chemistry; and Keith Yamamoto, 
Molecular Biology of the Cell). 
96 Id. (Samuel Kaplan, Chair, American Society for Microbiology Publications Board; and 
Mary Scanlan, Director of Publishing Operations, American Chemical Society). 
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three U.S. government agencies,97 two security intellectuals,98 five 
academic biologists,99 and a free speech activist100 also signed the 
document.  Reflecting what appears to have been mainstream opinion at 
both NAS workshops, the group acknowledged that information should 
sometimes be suppressed.  Crucially, however, it left the actual decision 
to individual editors: 
We recognize that on occasion an editor may conclude 
that the potential harm of publication outweighs the 
potential societal benefits.  Under such circumstances, 
the paper should be modified, or not be published.  
Scientific information is also communicated by other 
means:  seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc.  
Journals and scientific societies can play an important 
role in encouraging investigators to communicate results 
of research in ways that maximize public benefits and 
minimize risks of misuse.101 
The obvious problem with this statement was that it asked each 
editor to reach her own individual judgment about the balance of harms.  
This necessarily implied a weakest-link dynamic in which the 
community could only suppress papers if every single editor agreed.  As 
of 2003, however, it was still possible to think that editors would 
eventually close this loophole by negotiating detailed procedures and 
standards for deciding when papers should be suppressed.102  Fatally, 
this was not done.103 
                                                 
97 Id. (Elizabeth George, National Nuclear Security Administration/Department of 
Energy; Rachel Levinson, Office of Science and Technology Policy; and Harold Varmus and 
Henry Metzger, National Institutes of Health). 
98 Id. (David Heyman, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Thomas 
Inglesby, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism). 
99 Id. (Gerald Fink, MIT; Stephen S. Morse, Columbia University; Steven Salzberg, 
Institute for Genomic Research; Ariella Rosengard, University of Pennsylvania; and Eckard 
Wimmer, Stony Brook). 
100 Id. (Judith Krug, Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Libraries Association). 
101 Id. 
102 The most obvious solution would be to create an advice panel containing some 
suitable mix of security experts and academic scientists.  This would automatically ensure 
quality and consistency across decisions.  Some biologists called for an international 
committee to guide scientists whose work produced unexpectedly dangerous results even 
before 9/11.  See generally Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34. 
103 Academic scientists did, however, press for general rules defining data that should 
not be classified.  See e.g., COMM. ON GENOMICS DATABASES FOR BIOTERRORISM, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SEEKING SECURITY:  PATHOGENS, OPEN ACCESS, 
AND GENOME DATABASES 25–27 (2004) [hereinafter SEEKING SECURITY] (discussing open-
access policies for genome databases). 
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The crisis came in 2005 after Science editor-in-chief Donald Kennedy 
published an extraordinary editorial defending his journal’s decision to 
publish a synthetic biology paper whose authors had successfully 
resurrected the 1918 influenza virus.104  The first part of Kennedy’s 
defense—that Science had only reached its decision after consulting with 
the heads of the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Disease, and NIH’s Office of Biotechnology 
Activities—was unexceptional.105  The problem, Kennedy went on to 
explain, was that the head of NIH had not been satisfied and asked 
Science to contact the NSABB as well.  Because Science had complied, one 
might have expected Kennedy to congratulate himself on taking this 
extra step.  Instead, he loudly claimed that his “convictions” would have 
led him to publish the paper even if NSABB had wanted it suppressed.106  
In effect, Kennedy had publicly announced that he would publish what 
he liked—and dared critics to criticize him.  No one did. 
Three years after 9/11, it was clear that neither the public nor the 
Bush Administration cared enough to press the issue.  Instead, each 
editor was now free to do whatever she thought best—a result which 
more or less guaranteed that every experiment would be published by 
some journal somewhere.  As Professor Selgelid remarked, the editors’ 
extended flirtation with self-censorship had ended in an “unacceptable” 
result.107 
B. Discouraging “Experiments of Concern” 
The obvious alternative to censorship is to review controversial 
experiments before they start.  Unlike censorship, this strategy can do 
little to suppress unexpected results.  At the same time, it has the 
practical advantage that a blocked experiment produces no results, and 
is therefore far easier to suppress.  Pre-experiment review also avoids 
                                                 
104 Donald Kennedy, Better Never Than Late, 310 SCI. 195, 195 (2005). 
105 A careful reader might, however, have worried that none of the reviewers had any 
obvious weapons experience.  As Malcolm Dando and colleagues have repeatedly 
documented, biological weapons are a distinct and complex academic sub-discipline.  The 
fact that someone is a famous biologist (and in this case a Washington insider) does not 
necessarily mean that he or she is capable of spotting, let alone deciding, complex dual-use 
issues. 
106 Kennedy, supra note 104, at 195 (“So would I, given our own convictions, the timing, 
and what we had learned from our consultations with Gerberding, Fauci, and others, have 
published the paper even if the NSABB had voted otherwise?  Absolutely—unless they had 
it classified.”). 
107 Michael J. Selgelid, A Tale of Two Studies:  Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of 
Science, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2007, at 35, 41. 
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asking experimenters to discard months and perhaps even years of 
work. 
By 2003, academics had recommended various review schemes that 
could be implemented through voluntary self-governance108 or 
government regulation.109  These scattered proposals received a 
powerful boost in 2004 when the Fink Committee called on NIH to 
expand its existing review procedures to include what it termed 
“experiments of concern,” i.e., research that could make biological 
weapons cheaper or more effective.110  In general, this recommendation 
was warmly received by the synthetic biology establishment, who hoped 
to obtain increased government funding and needed a convincing but 
uncomplicated answer to biosecurity concerns.111  Promising an 
additional review layer was an easy way to do this. 
Fatally, the Fink Committee failed to say what this new review 
system would look like.  Instead, it asked the federal government to 
convene an advisory committee to fill this gap.112  Ultimately, this new 
                                                 
108 Gigi Kwik et al., Biosecurity:  Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an Age of 
Catastrophic Terrorism, 1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:  BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 
27 (2003). 
109 See JOHN STEINBRUNER ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L & SEC. STUDIES AT MD., CONTROLLING 
DANGEROUS PATHOGENS:  A PROTOTYPE PROTECTIVE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM (2003), available at  
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/pathogens_project_monograph.pdf (envisaging 
a worldwide system). 
110 SEEKING SECURITY, supra note 103, at 17–18.  The “experiments of concern” definition 
combined the six “weaponization” criteria developed at the National Academies’ August 
2002 Workshop with a somewhat recursive seventh category covering experiments that 
“[e]nable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.”  Id. at 18.  The call was 
immediately echoed by a Royal Society Report in the United Kingdom.  THE ROYAL SOC’Y 
& WELLCOME TRUST, DO NO HARM:  REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE MISUSE OF LIFE 
SCIENCE RESEARCH 1 (2004), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/ 
corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtx023408.pdf 
(“Research institutions and funding agencies need to consider how to build on existing 
processes for reviewing research projects to ensure that risks of misuse are assessed in an 
appropriate and timely manner.”). 
111 The connection between money and review was particularly evident in the high-
profile Gesteland Committee, then about to recommend that the U.S. Department of 
Energy massively increase its synthetic biology research budget.  Embracing the Fink 
Committee’s proposed review system allowed the Committee to treat security as if the 
problem had already been solved.  See DEP’T OF ENERGY BIOLOGICAL & ENVTL. RESEARCH 
ADVISORY COMM., DEP’T OF ENERGY, SYNTHETIC GENOMES:  TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPACT 8 
(2004) [hereinafter BERAC], available at http://www.science.doe.gov/ober/berac/ 
SynBio.pdf (last visited March 20, 2011) (“Acknowledging the potential for misuse of 
synthetic genome technology before adequate defenses can be mounted, [and arguing that] 
it would be prudent for scientists to work together with experts in national security to 
explore and develop practical strategies to prevent . . . its misuse, as recommended by the 
[Fink] Committee.”). 
112 NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT 
OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH:  STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE 
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National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (“NSABB”) did little 
more than repeat the Fink Committee’s call for government action 
without adding useful specifics.113  This left the ball squarely in HHS’s 
court.  Five years later, HHS still has no procedure for reviewing 
biosecurity issues.  The agency has, however, promised to revisit the 
review issue as part of a broader initiative to create a “culture of 
responsibility” for dual-use technologies.114 
In the meantime, many biologists saw no point in waiting and took 
action.  Since the Fink report, roughly one-third of all U.S. research 
universities have modified their safety reviews to include at least some 
security issues.115  By far the most ambitious example was a multi-
university collaboration called the Southeast Regional Center of 
Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (“SERCEB”).116  It 
operated a mandatory review system for member scientists from 2004 to 
2009.  As of 2007, SERCEB had reviewed twenty-seven research 
proposals, of which ten were found to include significant research of 
concern.117  These risks were managed through various strategies 
including training, physical security, experimental design, and limited 
published descriptions of sensitive methods.118  Interestingly, SERCEB 
never halted or significantly delayed a project.119  Indeed, its leadership 
reports that it became steadily more likely to avoid this outcome as time 
passed.120 
                                                                                                             
OF RESEARCH INFORMATION (2007) [hereinafter NSABB], available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/ 
biosecurity/pdf/Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07.pdf. 
113 See id. at 10.  NSABB suggested that experimenters who failed to seek review might be 
subject to unspecified “penalties.” Alternatively, compliance could “perhaps” be made “a 
term and condition of funding” or else a factor to be considered in grant applications.  Id. 
114 Public Consultation on Personnel Reliability and Culture of Responsibility Issues, 75 
Fed. Reg. 76,997 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
115 E-mail from Robert Cook-Deegan, Ctr. for Genome Ethics, Law & Policy, Duke 
University, to author (March 1, 2011, 12:18 EST) [hereinafter Cook-Deegan E-mail] (on file 
with author). 
116 SERCEB’s main member institutions included Duke, Emory, Vanderbilt, the 
University of North Carolina, the University of Florida, and the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham.  Id. 
117 We will see that this rate is roughly 1,000 times higher than biology as a whole.  See 
infra text accompanying note 123.  The discrepancy is almost certainly explained by 
SERCEB’s unusual focus on infectious diseases and biodefense research. 
118 E. Megan Davidson et al., Practical Experiences in Dual Use Review, 316 SCIENCE 1432, 
1433 (2007). 
119 Id. at 1433.  This continued to be true until the end of the program.  See Cook-Deegan 
E-mail, supra note 115. 
120 Davidson et al., supra note 118, at 1432.  On at least two occasions, SERCEB reviewers 
adopted this position in cases where the researchers themselves would have recommended 
suppressing publication and destroying their research materials.  See E. Megan Davidson et 
al., Supporting Online Material for Practical Experiences in Dual-Use Review, SCI. AAAS (June 8, 
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Since 2007, the NIH has similarly required thousands of intramural 
scientists to report any experiments of concern to a special Dual Use 
Screening Committee.  To date, the Committee has responded to several 
inquiries.  No “experiments or reporting of . . . results have required 
modification based on dual use concerns.”121  Finally, a group at the 
Goldman School of Public Policy at Berkeley has operated an online 
advice portal since April 2009. It has received no inquiries to date.122 
While disappointing, these results are not very surprising.  They do, 
however, teach two important lessons.  First, experiments of concern are 
very, very rare.  Indeed, it has been estimated that experiments of 
concern account for just 0.03% of all molecular biology experiments.123  
This suggests that even very aggressive systems may not generate large 
numbers of reviews.  Second, rank-and-file community members did not 
wait for government action.  Instead, they established their own 
voluntary review systems.  Section VIII will describe other instances in 
which synthetic biologists have moved faster and more decisively than 
regulators. 
                                                                                                             
2007), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2007/06/05/316.5830.1432.DC1/ 
Davidson-SOM.pdf.  There are several possible reasons for this divergence.  First, SERCEB 
leaders have had more time for study and reflection than individual researchers.  In this 
case, allowing the experiments to proceed was simply the best outcome.  Second, SERCEB’s 
leaders may have valued scientific freedom more than the average community member.  
This is plausible because researchers with strong views often self-select into leadership 
roles.  Finally, SERCEB leaders may have been protecting the community from an 
externalities problem.  Public controversy is expensive; therefore, investigators may 
sometimes suppress results even when publication is appropriate.  In this view, SERCEB’s 
strong defense of publication gave researchers the political cover they needed to make the 
right decision. 
121 E-mail from Henry Metzger, Scientist Emeritus, Nat’l Inst. of Arthritis & 
Musculoskeletal & Skin Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to author (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:08 EST) 
[hereinafter Metzger E-mail] (on file with author). 
122 Barry Bergman, Goldman School Portal Takes the Worry Out of ‘Experiments of Concern’, 
THE BERKELEYAN, April 2, 2009, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2009/04/ 
02_concern.shtml.  Peter Aldhous, Are Fears Over Bioterrorism Stifling Scientific Research?, 
NEW SCIENTIST (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16539-are-fears-
over-bioterrorism-stifling-scientific-research.html.  The facility will shut down in June 2011.  
Erika Check Hayden, ‘Experiments of Concern’ to Be Vetted On Line:  Expert Panel to Offer 
Advice on Science with Bioterror Applications, 457 NATURE 643, 643 (2009). 
123 Jeffrey Brainard, Advisory Panel Proposes That Scientists Monitor Their Own Security-
Related Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 20, 2007; see also STEINBRUNER ET AL., supra 
note 109, at 45 (arguing that experiments of concern account for well under one percent of 
all experiments). 
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VI.  CONTROLLING EXISTING TECHNOLOGY (A):  CODES OF CONDUCT, 
EDUCATION, AND TECHNICAL MEASURES 
Most observers agree that existing synthetic biology technologies 
pose risks that justify at least modest control efforts.  This Part reviews 
various measures, including codes of conduct, educational initiatives, 
and technology solutions that synthetic biologists have debated over the 
past decade.  Efforts to control access to artificial DNA are discussed 
separately in Part VII. 
A. Codes of Conduct 
Professional societies have adopted several codes of conduct since 
the 1980s, which prohibit biologists from developing weapons.  These 
efforts arguably intensified after 9/11.124  By 2005, the World Medical 
Association, British Royal Society, Red Cross, UN General Assembly, UN 
Security Council, UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Wellcome Trust, and sixty-eight national academies of science were 
calling on researchers to draft still more codes.125  These calls were 
seconded in the United States by the National Research Council’s high-
profile Fink (2004)126 and Relman (2006)127 reports. 
Against this background, synthetic biologists began discussing their 
own code as early 2003.128  By 2005, many community members agreed 
that a code would be useful, although these discussions remained 
“fragmentary.”129  Furthermore, there were widespread expectations that 
SB2.0 would make “significant progress” on the issue when it met in 
2006.130  While these hopes turned out to be premature,131 community 
members and outside scholars have continued to call for a code ever 
since.132 
                                                 
124 See Brian Rappert, Responsibility in the Life Sciences:  Assessing the Role of Professional 
Codes, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:  BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 164, 164–74 
(2004) (discussing a detailed history of these efforts). 
125 Id.; see also INTERACADEMY PANEL ON INT’L ISSUES, IAP STATEMENT ON BIOSECURITY 2 
(2005) (listing the organizations that endorse the call for researchers to draft more codes). 
126 FINK REPORT, supra note 38. 
127 COMM. ON ADVANCES IN TECH. & THE PREVENTION OF THEIR APPLICATION TO NEXT 
GENERATION BIOWARFARE THREATS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBALIZATION, 
BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES (2006) [hereinafter RELMAN REPORT). 
128 See, e.g., Endy, supra note 28, at 5 (“As one obvious example, biological engineering 
training could include professional development programs and codes of ethics. . . .). 
129 Church, supra note 43, at 423. 
130 Id. 
131 See infra Part VIII.A. 
132 See e.g., EUROPEAN GRP. ON ETHICS IN SCI. & NEW TECHS. TO THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
OPINION NO. 25:  ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (Nov. 17, 2009), available at 
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Why, then, is there still no synthetic biology code?  Professor 
Rappert argues that the problem is political.  Calls for codes usually 
reflect a fragile alliance between researchers who care about security, 
and those who mainly want to preempt government action.133  These 
groups almost always disagree as soon as the code project moves from 
generalities to specific “content or plans for promulgation.”134  Rappert’s 
observation also explains why the written codes “are less consequential 
and compliance-oriented and more circular than they might appear at 
first glance.”135 
In 2004, the Fink Committee tried to sidestep this dynamic by asking 
the federal government to create an entirely new body—the NSABB—to 
make the hard choices that codes demand.  However, the NSABB 
refused to grasp the nettle.  Instead, it only produced what it called a 
“resource” that “scientific societies, professional associations, and 
research institutions” could use to write codes of their own.136  While 
NSABB suggests that some of its “considerations” can be adopted 
verbatim, these are bland indeed.137 
In the meantime, the National Research Council’s Relman 
Committee in 2006 proposed a second way around the problem:  create 
online forums where members can report problems, share best practices, 
and eventually write codes together.138  Though the Committee did not 
say so, the tactic makes political sense because such forums will 
disproportionately attract scientists who sincerely care about reform.  
Forums also make practical sense.  Synthetic biology is so new that 
researchers may not know enough to identify threats or design sensible 
                                                                                                             
http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion25_en.pdf; RINIE VAN EST ET 
AL., RATHENAU INST., CONSTRUCTING A WORLD OF LIFE:  THE WORLD OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
(2007). 
133 Rappert, Responsibility, supra note 124. 
134 Id. at 164. 
135 Brian Rappert, Codes of Conduct and Biological Weapons:  An In-Process Assessment, 5 
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:  BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 145, 150 (2007). 
136 NSABB, supra note 112, at 28–29.  The document also stressed proper communication, 
thereby implying that the security problem had as much to do with public perception as 
any actual threat.  Id. 
137 The document urges researchers, inter alia, to “[c]onsider[]” whether their work could 
be misused, “[s]triv[e]” to design research that avoids dual-use concerns, “[w]eigh[] 
carefully” the benefits of the research against harms that could occur, and observe safe and 
ethical behaviors.  Id. at 48.  Similarly, it urges funding agencies to make sure that 
“appropriate systems are in place” to review experiments of concern and “[e]nsur[e] that 
both researchers and reviewers are knowledgeable of, and adhere to, all ethical, 
institutional, and legal requirements.”  Id. at 48–49.  The document does nothing to define 
these and similarly ambiguous terms.  Nor does it explain how this framework would be 
applied to any specific example. 
138 RELMAN REPORT, supra note 127. 
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solutions.  Forums are a natural way to collect this information.  Sadly, 
the Relman Committee’s proposal was never implemented.139 
B. How Useful Would It Be? 
Before leaving the subject, one should ask what purpose codes could 
serve.  Here, the naïve view—that a rule against making biological 
weapons will suppress terrorism—is almost certainly wrong.  Terrorists, 
after all, have extreme and very strong beliefs.  Even if we admit that 
codes might influence the average person, their effect on terrorists is 
almost certainly negligible. 
A more sensible justification is that most people, and Americans in 
particular, are reluctant to investigate and tell authorities about 
suspicious activities.  Publicly affirming the value of whistleblowers 
could plausibly increase scientists’ willingness to step forward.  In 
principle, code adoption could also encourage scientists working in 
covert state weapons programs to defect.140  As former Soviet weapons 
scientist Ken Alibek has stressed, it is hard to work for a biological 
weapons program when the world clearly despises such methods. 
Beyond these limited examples, it is hard to know what purpose a 
biosecurity code would serve.  Some activities, notably biosafety, lend 
themselves to the explicit, step-by-step instructions that codes provide.  
But few biosecurity tasks are like this.141  Instead, threats come in many 
different and often subtle forms.  Here, a code’s main function may be to 
remind researchers that they are not competent to judge biosecurity risk 
and should turn to outside experts when issues arise.142 
C. Education 
Codes of conduct are only effective when researchers are able to 
recognize problematic experiments.  However, empirical studies show 
                                                 
139 The Sloan Foundation studied but ultimately rejected the forum idea based on survey 
evidence that synthetic biologists would not participate absent “the threat of government 
regulation or some other external pressure on the scientific community.”  Pearson, supra 
note 32, at 6. 
140 Codes will not, of course, encourage many scientists to defect.  This may not matter, 
however, for covert state weapons programs that employ dozens and even hundreds of 
scientists, only one of whom must defect to reveal the secret. 
141 One important exception, as we will see, is screening DNA orders for possible threat 
sequences.  See infra Part VII (describing screening methods).  This activity, however, is 
much too specialized to include in a community-wide synthetic biology code. 
142 Such codes only make sense if the advice is actually obtainable.  However, many 
researchers may have trouble locating qualified biosecurity experts.  The Berkeley project 
has established its online advice portal to help fill this gap.  See supra note 122 and 
accompanying text. 
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that life scientists know very little about dual-use issues.143  The National 
Research Council’s Fink and Relman Committees have both called for 
improved, and perhaps mandatory, biosecurity education to fill this gap. 
In the meantime, some biologists moved forward with voluntary 
initiatives.  For example, SERCEB had administered a dual-use training 
module to more than 450 scientists by 2007.144  Similarly, NIH has 
repeatedly reminded its intramural researchers of dual-use issues, most 
recently in its Research Ethics Case Discussion exercise for 2009–2010.145  
Other groups that have developed education modules include the 
Federation of American Scientists, Bradford University, and the Center 
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.146 
Despite this, government has yet to say how much, if any, security 
education synthetic biologists should receive.  In 2010, NSABB published 
a report chiding the U.S. federal government for its failure to implement 
an “oversight paradigm.”147  The report also called on government to 
develop “[o]utreach and education strategies” aimed at “raising 
awareness of the dual use issue among synthetic biology’s diverse 
practitioners, especially among those that have not been participants in 
recent discussions on this topic.”148  HHS is currently considering 
regulations to implement some or all of these recommendations, 
although it is still not clear what will emerge. 
D. Technical Measures 
Given synthetic biology’s strong focus on engineering, it was more 
or less inevitable that members would suggest technical measures to 
                                                 
143 BRIAN RAPPERT, BIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS:  AN INQUIRY 
INTO RESEARCH AND METHODS (2007).  SERCEB’s in-house program for reporting and 
reviewing experiments of concern similarly found that “few investigators were aware of 
the dual-use dilemma,” that “many investigators were unaware of dual-use issues in their 
own research,” and that “sensitivity to dual-use concerns is highly subjective.”  Davidson 
et al., supra note 118, at 1432–33. 
144 Davidson et al., supra note 118, at 1433. 
145 Metzger E-mail, supra note 121. 
146 See Biosecurity Education Portal, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/ 
programs/bio/educationportal.html (last visited March 23, 2011). 
147 NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS 
RELATED TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY iii (2010) [hereinafter NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY], 
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/NSABB%20SynBio%20DRAFT%20 
Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10.pdf. 
148 Id. at 13.  The reference “diverse practitioners” provides a broad hint that some 
groups—for example, mainstream biologists—may need less education than others. This 
foreshadows the Presidential Commission on Bioethics’ more recent claim that synthetic 
biology’s “culture of responsibility” is already adequate and that future initiatives should 
focus on extending it to other groups.  See infra Part IX.C (describing the Commission’s 
synthetic biology report). 
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reduce risk.  These have taken various forms.  Probably the best-known 
idea has been to insert hidden (“steganographic”) messages, also known 
as watermarks, into gene sequences.  This data would bolster deterrence 
by helping authorities trace DNA used in attacks back to its source. The 
idea has been current since 2002149 and  was widely discussed at SB1.0150 
and in the weeks preceding SB2.0.151  So far, however, it has yet to be 
implemented in practical experiments. 
A second popular idea is to modify the “chassis” organisms that 
synthetic biologists use to host their designs so that they could not 
survive in the wild, were programmed to self-destruct after a fixed time, 
or included artificial genes that could not function in naturally occurring 
organisms.152  The Venter Institute took a first step in this direction by 
deliberately engineering its Mycoplasma mycoides bacterium so that the 
organism cannot cause disease in humans or survive outside the 
laboratory.153 
Finally, some synthetic biologists believe that customers will 
eventually be able to make genes on tabletop machines.  In principle, 
these devices could be programmed so that they refused to make 
problematic sequences.154 
E. Conclusion 
Despite extensive discussion, synthetic biologists have done 
relatively little to implement codes of conduct.  They have, however, 
developed important voluntary review and education programs.  HHS 
may eventually make some form of review and education mandatory. 
VII.  CONTROLLING EXISTING TECHNOLOGY (B):  DENYING SYNTHETIC DNA 
TO TERRORISTS 
The proposals so far would apply to almost any branch of 
microbiology.  One issue, however, is specific to synthetic biology.  We 
                                                 
149 See Andrew D. Ellington, Intelligence Countermeasures for Biological Threats passim 
(2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the use of “genetic 
taggants” within the context of biological terrorism). 
150 Carlson, supra note 42. 
151 Stephen M. Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action:  Community-Based Options for 
Improving Safety and Security in Synthetic Biology (Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working 
Paper Draft 1.1, 2006), available at http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/UC%20White%20Paper. 
pdf. 
152 Church, supra note 43, at 423; Pennisi, supra note 45, at 769. 
153 Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34. 
154 SCI. POLICY CTR., THE ROYAL SOC’Y, NEW APPROACHES TO BIOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT 9 (2009). 
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have seen that the synthetic biology revolution was built on cheap 
commercial sources of DNA.  Denying this resource to would-be 
terrorists has become synthetic biology’s most-discussed priority.155 
A. Licensing 
The most obvious way to control synthetic DNA is to license the 
equipment and reagents that make it.  Synthetic biologists discussed this 
option widely in the wake of 9/11,156 and many scholars still endorse it 
today.157  At the same time, implementation would require congressional 
action.  This makes licensing politically unlikely, at least in the short 
term. 
B. Screening Technologies 
We have already seen that most commercial gene-makers began 
screening customer orders shortly after 9/11.  However, these programs 
were developed in isolation and tend to be inconsistent.  The basic issue 
is how much effort companies should invest before deciding that a 
particular order is legitimate.  In practice, there are three choices:  
(1) human screening, (2) predefined threat lists, and (3) advanced 
software. 
Despite differences in detail, most of today’s gene-makers follow the 
first strategy—human screening.  The process begins by having a 
computer compare the customer’s order against the U.S. government’s 
exhaustive Genbank database to find the nearest matches among 
reported genes.  At this point, human experts examine each match’s 
known function as reported in Genbank annotations or the underlying 
literature.  These functions turn out to be problematic about one percent 
                                                 
155 The Department of Energy’s Gesteland Report had already noted in 2004 that 
synthetic biologists faced the special problem of “monitoring DNA sequences shipped 
from DNA synthesis facilities capable of producing large segments of DNA.”  BERAC, 
supra note 111, at 8. 
156 Carlson, supra note 42 (“Not for the first time in this circle did I hear suggestions of 
licensing for scientists and of strict controls on the distribution of technology and 
reagents.”); see also Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, at 18 
(documenting prevalence of licensing idea among synthetic biologists in the 2005- 2006 
time frame). 
157 See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132 (arguing that departments or research groups 
that use synthetic biology to perform biodefense experiments should be licensed and listed 
in a central registry); GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45 (describing options for registering 
synthesis machines and owners and people who purchase reagents); George Church, A 
Synthetic Bio-Hazard Non-Proliferation Proposal (Aug. 6, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/Church_Biohazard04c.doc (discussing 
licensing scheme for reagents and instruments). 
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of the time.  In such cases, companies must conduct further 
investigations to make sure that the sequence is being purchased for 
legitimate research.  Companies typically do this by checking the 
customer’s identity, asking about the proposed experiment, and, if 
necessary, consulting the authorities.158 
The current alternative to human screening relies on predefined lists.  
Instead of relying on employees to conduct research and make threat 
judgments after orders are received, companies could simply identify 
every Genbank threat in advance.  Once this list existed, human experts 
could be safely replaced by computers.  The problem, for now, is that 
existing threat lists are still painfully incomplete.  This suggests that 
human screening will continue to outperform list-based systems for at 
least a decade.159 
Lastly, existing screening methods are based on comparing 
requested DNA against similar sequences with known functions.  Some 
day scientists may be able to detect threats by inspecting the requested 
sequence itself.  For now, this remains a distant goal.160  That said, some 
researchers are writing advanced software to partially solve the problem.  
It is still not clear how well this will work.161 
While human screening works best today, other methods could 
eventually overtake it.  The real difference is economic.  While human 
screening costs little on average, experts can and do spend up to two 
hours in individual cases.  These costs are significant in an industry 
where the typical gene sells for about $10,000.  Automated solutions 
based on software or predefined lists would cut this cost nearly to zero. 
C. Screening Goals 
Over time, the debate over screening has come to include four 
sometimes incompatible goals.  The first, and by far the most obvious, is 
security—i.e., protecting human and animal life from terrorism.  This 
goal predominates in all public discussions and supplies the political 
pressure for regulation.  Over time, however, various subsidiary 
considerations have crept in.  The first involves companies’ 
understandable desire to know when they have complied with U.S. law.  
                                                 
158 See Maurer et al., supra note 1 (describing current industry screening practices). 
159 E-mail from Tom Slezak, Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., to author (Mar. 1, 2011, 
12:42 PST) (on file with author). 
160 COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC MILESTONES FOR THE DEV. OF A GENE SEQUENCE-BASED 
CLASSIFICATION SYS. FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF SELECT AGENTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION OF SELECT AGENTS:  A BRIGHTER LINE (2010) [hereinafter 
SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION]. 
161 See Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 24–25. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/4
2011] Synthetic Biology’s Stalled Security Agenda 1423 
While Congress’s Select Agent statute clearly applies to DNA, it has 
never been clear which sequences are covered.  Companies and 
regulators want to eliminate this ambiguity.162 
Relatedly, companies also prefer screening systems in which threat 
judgments are replicable.  This goal is poorly served by human screeners 
who can and sometimes do draw different threat judgments from the 
same data.  Some gene-makers have objected to this on the ground that 
threat judgments should be “consistent” from one company to the 
next.163  The downside, of course, is that consistency is not accuracy.  
Indeed, a system could have a 100% error rate and still be consistent, 
provided it made the same mistakes every time. 
Finally, companies would like to automate screening as much as 
possible.  Large gene-makers, in particular, have invested heavily in 
automation that allows them to make DNA faster and cheaper than their 
competitors.  Automated screening would enhance this advantage by 
eliminating the cost and delay associated with manual screening. 
On balance, it seems clear that screening’s original core purpose—
biosecurity—favors solutions based on human screening.  On the other 
hand, statutory compliance, consistency, and competitive considerations 
all favor automated screening.  Government, industry, and academics 
have spent much of the past decade trying to balance these 
considerations. 
D. (Mis-)Framing the Debate 
This tradeoff between human and automated screening methods is 
surely fundamental.  Strangely, however, most synthetic biology reports 
give human screening short shrift or overlook it entirely.  Part of the 
problem has to do with how threats are defined.  Historically, 
biosecurity professionals have almost always sided with the Relman 
Committee’s judgment that policymakers need to be aware of non-Select 
Agent threats, including other naturally occurring pathogens and even 
synthetic organisms.164  Furthermore, most synthetic biology studies 
have similarly embraced this position.165  But this presents a problem.  
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Hans Bügl et al., DNA Synthesis and Biological Security, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 627, 628 (2007). 
163 See, e.g., Claes Gustafsson Presentation Slides, FBI “Building Bridges” Conference, San 
Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 4–5, 2009) (on file with the author).  Gustafsson is DNA2.0’s Vice 
President for Marketing. 
164 RELMAN REPORT, supra note 127; see also Eileen R. Choffnes et al., A Brave New World in 
the Life Sciences:  The Breadth of Biological Threats Is Much Broader Than Commonly Thought and 
Will Continue to Expand, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 26–33 (arguing that 
the biosecurity threat is much broader than Select Agent organisms). 
165 See, e.g., Campos, supra note 1; SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION, supra note 160. 
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The reason is that broad threats imply extensive countermeasures.  
However, scholars have yet to develop any agreed or even intellectually 
coherent method for deciding which countermeasures are cost-
effective.166  This has tempted some analysts to simplify the problem by 
pruning the threat definition.  Within synthetic biology, the Sloan Report 
seems to have been the first to pursue this tack: 
Over the next five years, the key concern is for synthesis 
of a small number of highly pathogenic viruses that are 
otherwise difficult to obtain.  Ten years from now, it 
may be easier to synthesize almost any pathogenic virus 
than to obtain it through other means.  Eventually, the 
synthesis of bacterial pathogens may become possible as 
well.167 
The danger, of course, is that this approach makes the problem too 
manageable.  After all, a threat that can be reduced to “a small number of 
[known] viruses” implies that predefined lists are feasible.168  If so, the 
main strength of human solutions—flexibility in the face of unforeseen 
threats—vanishes. 
Is this truncation legitimate?  Here, everything hinges on the 
Report’s judgment that viruses are the only “key concern.”169  Because 
the authors do not explain this choice, their reasoning is necessarily 
speculative.  On the one hand, one can plausibly argue that “a small 
number of highly pathogenic viruses” really do pose a greater threat 
than other concerns.170  On the other hand, this hardly justifies ignoring 
other, assertedly lesser threats.  Security scholars have spent the past two 
decades warning against genetically engineered threats that range from 
inserting a single gene (e.g., to confer vaccine resistance on existing 
weapons) to massively reengineering entire genomes (e.g., to confer 
virulence on normally benign organisms).  Synthetic DNA makes all of 
these experiments enormously easier and may put them within the reach 
of terrorists.  In principle, this risk might be excludable on cost-benefit 
grounds.  Such a judgment would, however, invite a much more detailed 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Thomas Edmunds & Richard Wheeler, Setting Priorities:  Assessing Threats and 
Identifying Cost-Effective Responses to WMD Terrorism, in WMD TERRORISM:  SCIENCE AND 
POLICY CHOICES 191–210 (Stephen M. Maurer ed., 2009). 
167 GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45, at 13. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  Smallpox, uniquely among existing biological weapons, could plausibly inflict 
hundreds of thousands of casualties.  See, e.g., Rutherford & Maurer, supra note 6, at 122−27. 
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and probably inconclusive debate.  On closer examination, then, the 
Sloan Report’s truncation is not very satisfying.171 
Alas, truncation is not the only problem.  In most cases, the literature 
fails to mention human screening at all.172  Indeed, some scholars do not 
seem to realize that human screening is even an option.173  In hindsight, 
there are probably three reasons for this.  First, automated solutions are 
technological.  This makes them fun to think and write about.  By 
comparison, human screening methods are prosaic and make for 
uninteresting reading.  Second, most studies conventionally assume that 
concrete action will take place five or ten years into the future.  This 
encourages scholars to stress what automated systems might do in the 
future174 instead of asking what human screening can actually do today.  
Finally, we have seen some synthetic biologists argue that human 
screening is unaffordable.  Although this argument is doubtful, no one 
seems to have performed a careful analysis before 2009.175 
E. Conclusion 
The synthetic biology community has invested enormous time and 
effort in studying the screening problem.  Despite this, most of the 
                                                 
171 This is not really surprising, because any detailed justification would have to invoke 
the same kinds of cost-benefit calculus that the Report’s “key concept” rhetoric is supposed 
to avoid. 
172 The author does not know of a single article or report that focuses on the fundamental 
choice between human screening and automated methods prior to 2008.  Human screening 
was not even mentioned in the exhaustive and widely influential Sloan Report.  See 
generally GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45.  Nor did the author mention human screening in 
his own report for SB2.0.  Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151.  
Looking back, the problem may have been that academic security discussions invariably 
assumed that screening was a theoretical subject.  This overlooked the fact that most 
synthetic gene-makers had operated screening programs for years and knew a great deal 
about the problem.  This only became evident to the author once he began interacting with 
Markus Schmidt and other industry executives in early 2008.  The fact that many 
prominent gene companies, most notably DNA2.0, were lobbying the government for 
automated standards deepened the confusion. 
173 See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132, at 44 (“There have been suggestions that 
these companies screen all sequences for toxicity or infectivity before processing an order.  
That implies that databases of toxic or infective DNA sequences are available.”); NEW & 
EMERGING SCI. & TECH., EUROPEAN COMM’N, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY:  APPLYING ENGINEERING 
TO BIOLOGY 18 (EUR 21796) (2005) [hereinafter NEST-EUROPEAN COMM’N], available at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/syntheticbiology_b5_eur21796_en.pdf (last 
visited March 25, 2011) (stating that order screening “will require a genomic databank of 
potential pathogenic microorganisms and viruses, toxic genes and gene circuits”). 
174 The Department of Homeland Security also commissioned Gryphon Scientific’s Rocco 
Petrone to write a report surveying industry screening practices.  The document has never 
been made public. 
175 See Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 9–12. 
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literature either overlooks or fails to mention the fundamental choice 
between human screening and automated solutions.  This loss of focus 
has, in turn, encouraged scholars and regulators to devote almost all of 
their attention to automated solutions that are far less capable than the 
human screening methods that most gene-makers already use today. 
VIII.  TAKING ACTION 
By early 2006, most synthetic biologists agreed that artificial gene-
makers should screen customer orders for potential threat sequences.176  
The question was how to put this instinct into practice.  In the end, the 
community tried three different tracks:  government regulation, private 
industry standards, and academic self-regulation.177 
A. Academic Self-Governance 
SB1.0 highlighted security issues and fed expectations that SB2.0 
would take concrete action.178  The question remained, however, what 
academics could meaningfully do to improve security.  Here, the 
obvious “Asilomar” model was to lobby the government for regulation.  
However, some community members realized that direct action was also 
possible.  As early as 2003, Professor Drew Endy pointed out that 
academics could refuse to do business with gene synthesis houses unless 
they “[could] assure us that [they were] not synthesizing known threat 
agents.”179  Given the synthetic biology community’s purchasing power 
and moral authority, this tactic would exert significant pressure on 
companies to screen.  In late 2005, the University of California, Berkeley 
project began interviewing synthetic biologists to identify still more 
ideas that could be implemented by a community-wide vote at SB2.0.  In 
                                                 
176 See Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, at 14 (reporting that 
nineteen of the twenty-one synthetic biologists interviewed agreed on the need for 
screening). 
177 The academic, commercial, and government channels were almost entirely 
independent.  That said, many leading figures participated in more than one track.  For 
example, many academic scientists were associated with startup companies while most 
large gene-makers participated in both private and government standard setting.  The 
result was that actors who failed to get their way in one channel could and did try to obtain 
different outcomes elsewhere. 
178 Church, supra note 43, at 423.  But see Futures of Artificial Life, 431 NATURE 613, 613 
(2004) (“[T]here is no plan as yet for anything like another Asilomar.”). 
179 Endy, supra note 28, at 5.  Endy’s group later carried the procedure into practice.  See 
Editorial, The Peril of Genes for Sale, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 5, available at 
http://www.precaution.org/lib/05/genes_for_sale.051112.htm (reporting that Endy’s MIT 
lab only does business with companies “that operate transparent procedures for screening 
gene-synthesis orders for potential bioweapons”). 
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the end, the project compiled six resolutions that appeared to be both 
feasible and popular: 
1. Mandatory Screening.  The community could urge gene synthesis 
companies to screen according to prevailing best practices.  
Community members would stop placing orders with any 
company that failed to comply by year’s end. 
2. Improved Screening.  The community could work to develop 
better screening tools.  Members would “review and endorse 
these products” when they met the following year for SB 3.0.180 
3. Establishing Norms:  Obtaining Advice.  The community could 
remind members considering experiments of concern of their 
obligation to obtain “expert independent advice before 
proceeding.”  The community would make this advice available 
to anyone who needed it.181 
4. Establishing Norms:  Investigating and Reporting Dangerous 
Behavior.  The community could remind members that they had 
“an ethical obligation to investigate and, if necessary, report” 
dangerous behavior to authorities.182 
5. Clearinghouses.  Members could establish a “confidential 
clearinghouse[] to collect, analyze, and disseminate” experiences 
and information about biosecurity risk.183 
6. Technical Solutions.  Members could urge funding agencies to 
explore technologies for (a) inserting data into DNA identifying 
the maker (“watermarking”), and (b) engineering host 
organisms that had “little or no chance of surviving” outside the 
laboratory (“inherently safe chasses”).184 
In early 2006, community members discussed these proposals in two 
town hall meetings webcast from Berkeley, California and Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.185  The roughly three-dozen attendees voted to debate the 
first four resolutions at SB2.0. 
This success was short-lived.  A few weeks before the conference, 
organizers convened a telephone meeting that decided against holding 
the scheduled vote after all.186  The reasons for this about-face were never 
announced.  Conversations with attendees, however, suggest that the 
                                                 
180 Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, app. A at 4. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. app. A at 5 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 3. 
186 Apart from the two organizers, none of the attendees were synthetic biologists. 
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decision was motivated by concerns that SB2.0 had no constitutional 
procedure for voting, that a vote might split the community, and that a 
vote might invite public controversy.187  This decision was later 
reinforced when thirty-five activist groups wrote to conference leaders 
demanding that the previously announced vote be canceled.188 
Members of the press attending SB2.0 was quick to note what had 
happened.  For example, New Scientist explained that SB2.0 had rejected 
the proposals because they were “controversial” and “too much for 
synthetic biologists themselves.”189  It also suggested that some 
participants thought that it was too early to act until more research had 
been done on screening and other options.190  Similarly, Science remarked 
that SB2.0 “only took baby steps toward self-regulation.”191 
Organizers softened this disappointment by offering the press an 
online Declaration192 in place of the promised vote.  This generally 
followed the original conference proposals by promising (a) to “support 
the organization of an open working group,” (b) to coordinate improved 
and freely available software tools for screening, (c) to encourage 
companies to adopt “best-practice sequence checking technology,” and 
(d) to “encourage individuals and organizations to avoid patronizing 
companies that do not systematically check their DNA synthesis 
                                                 
187 See Stephen M. Maurer & Laurie Zoloth, Synthesizing Biosecurity, BULL. ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 16–18. 
188 Backgrounder:  Open Letter on Synthetic Biology, ETC GROUP (May 17, 2006), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/11.  There is an urban legend that synthetic biologists 
dropped their plans for self-regulation because of this e-mail.  See, e.g., de Vriend, supra 
note 46, at 65 (“[T]he organizers . . . were sensitive to critical comments of various 
participants and the NGO letter.  This has most likely contributed to the decision not to 
vote on a common statement on the third day of the conference in May 2006.”).  In fact, the 
decision had already been taken weeks earlier. 
189 Peter Aldhous, Synthetic Biologists Reject Controversial Guidelines, NEW SCIENTIST (May 
23, 2006), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9211-synthetic-biologists-reject-
controversial-guidelines.html. 
190 Id.  The article gives a useful cross section of what attendees were thinking: 
But in the end, the proposal proved too much for synthetic biologists 
themselves.  Some argued that it is  too early to boycott gene synthesis 
firms, as it is not yet clear how best to screen for sequences that might 
be used to make a bioweapon.  Also, they say, there are currently no 
clear channels through which dangerous  experiments could be 
reported.  The meeting declaration, due to be released later this week, 
will instead pledge to help develop software and other tools to 
improve companies’ ability to identify orders for potentially 
dangerous DNA. 
Id. 
191 Service, supra note 25, at 1116. 
192 See Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology, 
SYNTHETICBIOLOGY.ORG (2006), http://syntheticbiology.org/SB2Declaration.html. 
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orders.”193  Ironically, the Declaration was never finalized.  This, 
however, has not stopped scholars from citing it as an authoritative 
statement by the community.194  More importantly, it seems to have 
encouraged work on improved screening technologies that might not 
otherwise have taken place.195 
Despite the Declaration, scholars have quite reasonably seen SB2.0’s 
self-governance initiative as a “failed attempt.”196  Certainly, synthetic 
biologists have tried nothing of the sort since.  There are at least three 
reasons for this.  First, modern academic communities lack any deep 
tradition of self-governance.197  Absent Carnegie support, it is doubtful 
that SB2.0 would have attempted a vote in the first place.  Second, SB2.0 
showed members how easily a vote can be derailed.  This was bound to 
deter future organizers.  Third, the same activists who opposed 
governance at SB2.0 were later invited to attend SB3.0 and organize a 
session at SB4.0.198  This gave them a much improved platform for 
blocking community self-governance in the future. 
                                                 
193 Id.  The document also supported further discussions about “challenges to biological 
security and biological justice.”  Id. 
194 See, e.g., ANDREW BALMER & PAUL MARTIN, INST. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY:  SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES (2008), available at http://www.synbiosafe. 
eu/uploads///pdf/synthetic_biology_social_ethical_challenges.pdf; Bügl et al., supra note 
162, at 627–29 (announcing collaboration to implement the Declaration); Alexander Kelle, 
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity:  From Low Levels of Awareness to a Comprehensive Strategy, 10 
EMBO REPS. S23 (2009), available at http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v10/n1s/ 
pdf/embor2009119.pdf. 
195 Kelle, supra note 194.  The Declaration promised that “an open working group” would 
improve the “existing software tools for screening DNA sequences.”  Id. at S25.  This was 
done although no software was ultimately produced.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Declaration kept the screening issue alive.  This indirectly contributed to later industry 
initiatives.  See infra Part VIII.B (discussing the development of industry standards). 
196 ERIK PARENS ET AL., WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY:  AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATES 12 (2009), available at 
http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6334/synbio3.pdf.  But see Service, 
supra note 25, at 1116 (quoting Harvey Rubin as stating that the Declaration was “a good 
thing to start with”). 
197 Biology’s most widely advertised example of self-governance, the Asilomar 
conference, had taken place more than a quarter century before.  Furthermore, most of its 
self-governance had consisted of petitioning the U.S. government for regulation, although 
members did agree to a voluntary interim moratorium on experiments.  See, e.g., ORG. 
COMM. FOR THE INT’L CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES, SUMMARY 
STATEMENT OF THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES 1, 10 
(1975), http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/B/C/G/D/_/qqbcgd.pdf (recommending safety 
measures, describing ongoing “pause in certain aspects of research,” and noting efforts by 
national bodies “[i]n many countries” to formulate codes of practice). 
198 Strangely, the activists came to see their participation at these conferences as an 
achievement in its own right: 
Astonishingly ETC Group and friends are on the agenda too.  On 
Saturday we will be running a panel on the Global Societal Impacts of 
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It is hard to know when a process is completely moribund.  
Certainly, one can imagine academic self-governance reemerging in, for 
example, some future professional society expressly set up for that 
purpose.  For now, however, no such body is in the works.  Indeed, 
recent claims that a consensus exists within synthetic biology have been 
careful to avoid anything resembling an open vote.199 
B. Industry Standards 
A few weeks after SB2.0, four big gene synthesis companies—
Geneart, Codon Devices, Blue Heron, and Codagenomics—announced a 
new International Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis (“ICPS”) 
whose members would “work together to develop technologies that 
improve safety and security in synthetic biology.”200  Shortly thereafter, 
six ICPS members coauthored an article in Nature Biotechnology along 
with four FBI agents, two academics, and two non-ICPS business 
executives announcing what they called “a process for developing 
effective governance of DNA synthesis technology.”201  What this 
process consisted of, exactly, was unclear.  Indeed, ICPS was careful to 
say that its two main tasks—developing minimum standards for 
screening and reporting and conducting future research to improve 
software to reduce false positives and handle higher volumes—were 
“unresolved issues.”202  By comparison, the article was very explicit 
                                                                                                             
Synthetic Biology along with some civil society colleagues . . . .  In 
some ways its [sic] a far cry from two years ago when civil society was 
turned away from the same Syn Bio confab meeting in California.  On 
that occasion we had to resort to an open letter to prevent a disastrous 
self governance proposal going ahead. 
Hanging in Hong Kong with the Syn Bio Crowd, ETCETERA BLOG (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://etcblog.org/2008/10/10/hanging-in-hong-kong-with-the-syn-bio-crowd/.  
Ironically, the blogger also complains that “meaningful progress on establishing 
accountable oversight of Synthetic Biology has stalled and doesn’t look likely to start 
moving again any time soon.”  Id.  The complaint carefully ignores ETC’s own role in 
blocking self-regulation at SB2.0. 
199 The trend is particularly apparent in the EU-funded SYNBIOSAFE project, which 
conducted extensive interviews and an online conference to find out what synthetic 
biologists think.  The group then argued that it had found various “consensus” positions 
without, however, asking synthetic biologists to endorse them.  The supposed consensus 
was roundly criticized by audience members at SB4.0. 
200 About the ICPS, INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR POLYNUCLEOTIDE SYNTHESIS, 
http://polysynth.info/ (last visited June 20, 2007) (on file with author) (stating that ICPS 
goals include “work[ing] with governmental organizations to help facilitate the creation of 
a governance framework and associated safety protocols to foster an appropriate 
regulatory environment for the synthetic biology industry”). 
201 Bügl et al., supra note 162, at 627.  The four FBI agents participated as coauthors in 
their “individual” capacities.  Id. at 628. 
202 Id. at 629. 
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about what the authors did not want.  In particular, it insisted that any 
eventual screening regime should impose, at most, a “modest cost and 
with little or no impact on delivery times.”203  The authors justified this 
demand with the familiar argument that regulation would drive gene 
synthesis overseas.204 
These constraints clearly ruled out human screening.  Instead, the 
authors predicted a regime in which “companies would use validated 
software tools to check synthesis orders against a set of select agents or 
sequences to help ensure regulatory compliance and flag synthesis 
orders for further review.”205  Companies would pay for this ICPS-
approved software through licensing fees.206  In the end, none of this 
mattered.  In the summer of 2009, ICPS quietly folded without producing 
any software. 
One might have thought that this was the end of the story.  In fact, 
industry was just getting started.  In April 2008, the International 
Association Synthetic Biology (“IASB”), Germany’s leading trade 
association, hosted a workshop to discuss practical steps that industry 
could take to improve biosecurity.207  Participants publicly promised to 
move forward with a slate of specific “work packages” including:  (a) a 
                                                 
203 Id. at 628. 
204 Id. at 628–29.  The article also rejected previous suggestions that gene-makers pool 
customer order data in a central repository.  This was said to be “impractical and 
ineffectual” although no reasons were given.  Id. at 629. 
205 Id. at 627 (caption to Figure 1). 
206 Significantly, the authors said nothing about how their scheme would impact 
competition.  ICPS’s Membership Agreements strongly suggest that the organization 
planned to earn substantial license revenues from non-ICPS members.  See, e.g., Int’l 
Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis, Director Membership Agreement (Aug. 13, 2007) 
(on file with author) (recognizing that ICPS holds “all right, title, and interest in and to any 
and all software and documentation created or developed, and in and to all patentable 
inventions conceived or first reduced to practice solely by the Consortium, its employees, 
or consultants”).  Strangely, U.S. authors have hardly ever analyzed the antitrust 
implications of this scheme.  For a European perspective, see NEST-EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
supra note 173 (arguing that European database laws should be invoked to override 
copyright laws that deny access to lists needed to screen) and Anna Deplazes et al., The 
Ethics of Synthetic Biology:  Outlining the Agenda, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 5. 
207 See HUBERT BERNAUER ET AL., INT’L. ASS’N SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
FOR BIOSECURITY IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (2008), http://www.ia-sb.eu/tasks/ 
sites/synthetic-biology/assets/File/pdf/iasb_report_biosecurity_syntheticbiology.pdf.  
Workshop participants included representatives from Eurofins MWG, Sloning, ATG 
Biosynthetics, Febit, Entelechon GmbH, TESSY, Information Services to Life Science, 
Geneart, Craic Computing, and Integrated DNA Technologies, Inc.  The first seven 
companies were IASB members.  Id. at 3.  Geneart, Craic, and IDT were ICPS members and 
initially suggested that ICPS might join in the report.  The idea was dropped when ICPS 
disbanded later that summer. 
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Code of Conduct specifying responsible screening practices;208 (b) an 
online platform that would allow member companies to share threat 
data (“VIREP”); (c) a white paper discussing current industry practice 
with respect to screening; and (d) a Technical Biosecurity Group to share 
information and further develop best practices.209  IASB began work on 
all but the last of these initiatives within a few months.  By early 2009, 
IASB’s Code initiative had been singled out for praise in the pages of 
Nature210 and was being actively tracked by actors ranging from the U.S. 
State Department to diplomats attending biological weapons talks in 
Geneva. 
By mid-2009, the draft Code was largely complete.  That July, IASB 
announced that it would host a meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts to 
finalize the document.  So far, so good.  In August, however, two big 
gene-makers, DNA2.0 and Geneart, hastily assembled a competing 
proposal.211  Unlike IASB’s Code, the new proposal was based on using a 
predefined list.  This made it, as its authors boasted, “fast” and 
“cheap.”212  The question, as with all list-based proposals, was 
completeness.  This judgment, however, could not be made since 
DNA2.0’s list was, and is, secret.213  In any case, the proposal did not last 
very long.  In September, Nature reported that a “standards war” had 
broken out between IASB and the Geneart/DNA2.0 coalition.214  DNA2.0 
and Geneart stopped mentioning their fast and cheap proposal shortly 
afterward. 
They did not, however, abandon the standards war.  Instead, they 
approached three other big U.S. gene-makers to develop a new and, as it 
turned out, much stronger standard.  Over time, these secret discussions 
led to an agreement and self-styled “Consortium.”215  Collectively, this 
new group claimed to represent about eighty percent of the industry’s 
                                                 
208 IASB’s Code should not be confused with the codes for governing general 
professional behavior described in Part VI.  Instead, it was limited to defining a specific 
task in detail.  It probably would have been more accurate to call IASB’s document a 
protocol instead.  This usage was eventually taken up by a later competing document in 
November 2009.  See infra notes 219–21. 
209 BERNAUER ET AL., supra note 207, at 16–18. 
210 See Editorial, Pathways to Security, 455 NATURE 432, 432 (2008) (praising IASB’s Code 
initiative as “laudable”). 
211 DNA2.0 Presentation Slides, FBI “Building Bridges Conference,” San Francisco, Cal. 
(Aug. 4−5, 2009) (on file with the author). 
212 Id. 
213 More recently, DNA2.0 has said that a list exists but is secret.  May, supra note 49. 
214 Erika Check Hayden, Keeping Genes Out of Terrorists’ Hands, NATURENEWS (Aug. 31, 
2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090831/full/461022a.html. 
215 DNA2.0 later described the discussions as a “secret pact.”  Daniel Grushkin, Synthetic 
Bio, Meet “FBIo,” SCIENTIST, May 2010, at 44, available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/article/display/57355/. 
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worldwide installed capacity.216  Unlike the IASB, this new alliance was 
closed to all but the largest gene-makers.217  This was done, according to 
one member, to maintain a big company “perspective about the scale of 
the gene-synthesis industry, which helps us to decide what are 
practically implementable decisions.”218  Closed membership also meant 
that Consortium members could make decisions without exposing 
themselves to criticism from other companies or the public at large. 
IASB held its Cambridge meeting as scheduled on November 3, 
2009.219  Unlike the Consortium, the proceedings were open.  Indeed, 
representatives of the U.S. government, the press, and even two 
Consortium members, Geneart and Blue Heron, attended.220  Most of the 
session was devoted to careful line-by-line revisions of the draft.  
Members then finalized the document and took it back to their respective 
companies for ratification.  By month’s end, eight companies had signed 
the document.  Significantly, this figure included two Shanghai-based 
gene-makers that had not previously been involved in the process.221 
At first, Consortium members were non-committal and suggested 
that they, too, might join the IASB standard.222  Three weeks later, 
however, they announced a competing “Harmonized Protocol” 
document.  This puzzled many observers because the Protocol—though 
couched in entirely new language—mirrored the IASB Code point-for-
point, most notably in its commitment to human screening.223  Creating a 
                                                 
216 INT’L GENE SYNTHESIS CONSORTIUM, HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL:  GENE 
SEQUENCE & CUSTOMER SCREENING TO PROMOTE BIOSECURITY 1, 
http://www.genesynthesisconsortium.org/Harmonized_Screening_Protocol_files/IGSC%
20Harmonized%20Screening%20Protocol.pdf. 
217 Erika Check Hayden, Gene-makers Form Security Coalition, NATURENEWS (Nov. 18 
2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091118/full/news.2009.1095.html. 
218 Id. (quoting DNA2.0 President Jeremy Minshull). 
219 Geneart representatives asked IASB to cancel the vote at the last moment, arguing that 
the big companies were working on a standard that the entire industry could use.  This 
suggestion had essentially no chance of being adopted because Consortium members 
refused to let IASB members attend, much less vote at their meetings. 
220 Corie Lok, Gene-makers Put Forward Security Standards, NATURENEWS (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091104/full/news.2009.1065.html. 
221 Code of Conduct for Best Practices in Gene Synthesis, INT’L ASS’N SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, 
http://www.ia-sb.eu/go/synthetic-biology/activities/press-area/press-information/code 
-of-conduct-for-best-practices-in-gene-synthesis/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  Probably the 
most important compromise was to limit human screening to matches drawn from bacteria 
and viruses.  This was based on a judgment that current technology could not make 
weapons from other organisms in any case.  The compromise allowed computers to 
prescreen ninety-nine percent of all orders automatically.  The compromise was proposed 
by the U.S.-based Synthetic Biology Industry Association, which later endorsed the Code. 
222 Lok, supra note 220. 
223 IGSC promised to use “automated screening as a filter to identify pathogen and toxin 
DNA sequences.”  HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL, supra note 216, at 2.  All of these 
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parallel standard did, however, let Consortium members avoid open 
meetings and power-sharing with IASB.224  This was important because 
Consortium members had explicitly retained the right to change the 
Protocol in the future.225 
Even so, the Consortium’s decision to create a redundant standard 
was only a detail.  Between the Code and Protocol, more than eighty 
percent of all gene-makers had now endorsed human screening.  This, in 
turn, put even more pressure on the industry’s remaining hold-outs to 
adopt one standard or the other.  At this point, it was reasonable to think 
that the dominoes would continue falling until the entire industry had 
adopted human screening. 
It was not to be. On November 28th, the U.S. government issued 
draft guidelines for screening. Unlike the two private standards, this 
official document suggested that a predefined list might be good enough 
after all. Not surprisingly, commercial gene-makers reacted to this 
announcement by adopting a wait-and-see attitude. No new companies 
have joined the Code or Protocol since then. 
C. Government Regulation 
The U.S. government’s draft guidelines had been a long time 
coming.  Five years earlier, the National Research Council’s Fink 
Committee had called for a new body that could advise the federal 
government on the need for regulation.  The Bush Administration duly 
created the National Scientific Advisory Committee for Synthetic Biology 
(“NSABB”) in 2005.  One of the Committee’s first projects was to write a 
report urging the U.S. government to develop a process that private 
synthetic gene companies could use to screen incoming orders.226  
Strikingly, the report stressed that these standards should address all 
threat sequences whether or not they were associated with Select 
Agents.227  Beyond this, however, the report said almost nothing about 
                                                                                                             
would then be reviewed by “a human expert.”  Id.  IASB members had similarly agreed to 
permit an automated prescreen several weeks earlier.  See supra note 208 and 
accompanying text. 
224 The depth of this feeling is reflected in Consortium members’ consistent refusal to 
mention IASB and its Code of Conduct in any article or public talk.  This is more than a 
little strange, because the Consortium Protocol was clearly drafted in response to IASB’s 
Code.  Consortium members’ silence has caused endless confusion by leading casual 
observers and some journalists to conflate the Consortium Protocol with the IASB’s Code. 
225 HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL, supra note 216, at 4. 
226 See NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY, supra note 147, at 8.  Gene-makers who failed to 
adopt the standards would be barred from doing business with federal grantees or 
contractors.  Id. at 11. 
227 See id. (providing that federal regulations should apply to all threat pathogens 
whether “Select Agents or otherwise”).  NSABB also called on government agencies to 
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what the federal regulations would look like.  Worse, it failed to mention 
the fundamental choice between human screening and automated 
solutions.228 
In March 2007, the U.S. government convened an interagency Task 
Force under HHS’s leadership to develop formal regulations.229  In 
retrospect, this stacked the deck against strong regulation.  Indeed, HHS 
later admitted that any regulation “much more onerous than what 
providers are currently doing . . . might be of some concern.”230  This 
position was peculiar, to say the least.  After all, the normal assumption 
is that regulation is necessary because industry has done too little.  Here, 
however, HHS was deliberately treating current industry efforts as a 
ceiling for regulation.  This implied that government regulation could at 
most harmonize, not raise, the existing level of effort. 
The fact that human screening was a practical option should have 
been obvious, at the latest, when IASB issued its first draft Code of 
Conduct in September 2008.  In practice, however, HHS paid little or no 
attention to private standards until DNA2.0 and Geneart announced 
their fast and cheap alternative in August 2009.231  Even then, federal 
officials praised both sides without addressing the fundamental choice 
between human screening and automated methods. 
As already discussed, the great majority of gene synthesis companies 
embraced human screening standards in November 2009.  By then, 
however, the federal government had invented a very different 
approach.  HHS published this “Best Match” standard on November 27, 
2009.232  It required companies to investigate gene sequences if, and only 
if, they were closer to genes associated with Select Agents than to any 
other organism found in Genbank.233  The great advantage of Best Match 
was, of course, that it could be readily automated.  At the same time, 
HHS knew that the Select Agent list did not begin to cover the spectrum 
                                                                                                             
“develop and promote standards and preferred practices for screening orders and 
interpreting the results, and require that orders be screened by providers.”  Id. 
228 To the contrary, the report seemed to endorse automated solutions by urging the 
government to develop standards for “determining the sequences for which to screen.”  Id.  
This was, at the very least, a revealing slip of the pen. 
229 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SCREENING FRAMEWORK GUIDANCE FOR PROVIDERS 
OF SYNTHETIC DOUBLE-STRANDED DNA 1 (2010) [hereinafter HHS, SCREENING 
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/ 
Documents/syndna-guidance.pdf. 
230 Wadman, supra note 55 (quoting Jessica Tucker). 
231 The Task Force was briefed on IASB’s activities as early as September 2008. 
232 See Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers, 74 
Fed. Reg. 62,319, 62,319–27 (Nov. 27, 2009) (discussing the Best Match standard). 
233 Id. at 62,323. 
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of possible threats and that Best Match had no chance of detecting 
them.234  Only human screeners could do that. 
D. Harmonizing Outcomes 
HHS did not finalize its Guidelines for nearly a year.  During that 
time, several scholars published articles complaining that Best Match did 
nothing to detect threats beyond the Select Agent list and was less 
capable than the private standards that industry had already adopted.235  
Formally, HHS could easily have closed this gap by adding a human 
screening requirement to Best Match.  It did not.  HHS did, however, 
revise the Guidelines in important ways.  The original draft had claimed 
to implement the broad principle that “[p]roviders should know if the 
nature and identity of the product that they are selling poses a hazard to 
public health, agriculture, or security.”236  This implied that companies 
could meet all of their biosecurity obligations by adopting Best Match.  
The final Guidelines, by comparison, were limited to the much narrower 
principle that “[p]roviders should know if the product that they are 
synthesizing and distributing contains . . . a ‘sequence of concern.’”237  
While HHS admitted that non-Select Agents also posed a biosecurity 
threat,238 the final Guidelines said nothing about how to screen for them 
                                                 
234 The clearest admission is found in the final Guidelines: 
The U.S. Government recognizes that there are concerns that synthetic 
dsDNA sequences not unique to the Select Agents or Toxins or CCL 
items may also pose a biosecurity concern. . . . However, due to the 
complexity of determining pathogenicity and because research in this 
area is ongoing and many such agents are not currently encompassed 
by regulations in the U.S., generating a comprehensive list of such 
agents to screen against is not currently feasible and hence is not 
provided in this Guidance. 
HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 9. 
235 See, e.g., Markus Fischer & Stephen M. Maurer, Harmonizing Biosecurity Oversight for 
Gene Synthesis, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 20 (2010); Jonathan B. Tucker, Double-Edged 
DNA:  Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2010, at 23, 
available at http://www.issues.org/26.3/tucker.html; Malcolm Dando, Synthetic Biology:  
Harbinger of an Uncertain Future?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-dando/synthetic-biology-
harbinger-of-uncertain-future. 
236 Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 62,320. 
237 HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 3. 
238 Id. at 9.  HHS admitted in the accompanying FAQs that “it is not possible at this time 
to provide a robust database that would identify all or even most dangerous sequences.”  
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Frequently Asked Questions:  Screening Framework 
Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/synbio-faq.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter HHS, Frequently Asked Questions]. 
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apart from urging industry to address the issue.239  Each firm would 
have to decide for itself which, if any, additional steps were needed to 
operate responsibly. 
Why did HHS limit itself to Select Agent threats?  Superficially, the 
answer was that “generating a comprehensive list of [other threats] to 
screen against is not currently feasible and hence is not provided in this 
Guidance.”240  But this answer only made sense if human screening was 
somehow undesirable.  Here, HHS offered several arguments.241  First, it 
pointed out that human screening involved examining similar gene 
sequences and that this implied a “cut-off” beyond which matches 
would not be examined.242  This criterion, HHS argued, “would be 
arbitrary.”243  In fact, though, biologists had been using cutoffs for years.  
It would have been straightforward to incorporate one of these into the 
Guidelines. 
Second, HHS argued that it wanted a standard that was “feasible for 
small and large providers, as well as international providers.”244  But this 
argument was also doubtful.  After all, most of the industry―including 
companies of every size―had already agreed to adopt human screening.  
This plainly implied that human screening was “feasible.” 
Finally, HHS argued that Best Match offered “consistency, because a 
hit for one company should register as a hit for other companies 
adhering to the guidance.”245  This last argument was probably the most 
plausible.  At the same time, it represented a distinct policy choice.  HHS 
clearly had the power to issue standards that required human 
discretion.246  By refusing to do so, the agency had elevated a subsidiary 
goal―that threat judgments should be replicable―over security itself. 
                                                 
239 See id. (remarking that “many providers have already instituted measures to address 
these concerns” and that “ongoing development of best practices in this area is 
commendable and encouraged”). 
240 HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 9. 
241 The FAQs refer to human screening methods as “Top Homology.”  HHS, Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 238. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id.; see also Heidi Ledford, Gene-Synthesis Rules Favour Convenience, 467 NATURE 898, 
898 (2010) (stating that officials believed that “human screens could lead to inconsistencies 
between companies,” whereas Best Match would “ensure a consistent baseline that can be 
uniformly applied across industry” (quoting Theresa Lawrence)). 
246 See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 (1952) (affirming 
regulations incorporating the exercise of human discretion). 
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E. Conclusion 
It would have been both logical and easy for HHS to endorse the 
human screening standards developed by IASB and the Consortium.  
The fact that it refused to do so strongly suggests that it had (and 
presumably still has) little or no appetite for regulation. 
IX.  THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE 
Synthetic biology is now almost a year into its second decade.  At 
least formally, HHS’s work is not done.  First, it admits that the 
Guidelines are incomplete.  This suggests that they will eventually need 
to be modified.  Second, and more immediately, NSABB has called on 
the agency to develop review procedures for experiments of concern.  
HHS is not likely to ignore this commitment.  On the other hand, these 
future regulations―like Best Match itself―could well be anemic.  This 
Section asks how much life is left in synthetic biology’s security agenda. 
A. The Future of Private Standards 
The final HHS Guidelines leave industry responsible for deciding 
what procedures, if any, should be adopted to guard against threats 
beyond the Select Agents list.  Superficially, at least, the IASB’s Code of 
Conduct and the Consortium’s Protocol should remain in force.  At the 
same time, the current situation is unstable.  If one or two companies 
decide to revise or abandon their commitments, price competition could 
quickly force the rest to follow suit. 
As this Article goes to press, the tea leaves are hard to read.  On the 
one hand, DNA2.0 has suggested that it will use a list-based approach, 
even though, absurdly, its list remains secret.247  On the other, 
Consortium member IDT has publicly reaffirmed its commitment to 
human screening, promising that “[t]here’s never a case where we would 
have a gene go right into production without a human being having 
looked at both the sequence and the prospective customer.”248  Finally, 
outside commentators have said that the Guidelines are less a definitive 
                                                 
247 May, supra note 49. 
248 Michael Eisenstein, Synthetic DNA Firms Embrace Hazardous Agents Guidance But 
Remain Wary of Automated ‘Best Match’, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225, 1226 (2010) 
(quoting Robert Dawson, a director at Integrated DNA Technologies).  IASB member 
Entelechon similarly reaffirmed that employees would continue to examine the “complete 
lists of hits” and not just those flagged by computers.  Id. at 1225 (quoting Markus Fischer).  
Markus Fischer, the director and cofounder of Entelechon, further stated that “[a] fully 
automated screening system leaves significant biosecurity questions unanswered.”  Id. 
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solution than “something to be improved over time.”249  Such 
expectations will make it harder for companies that have endorsed the 
Code or Protocol to change their minds. 
B. More Studies Are Needed? 
Pressure for reform depends on the public’s attention span.  This will 
inevitably fall off if scholars stop writing articles and reports.  Ideally, 
these new publications should also advance the literature.  Here, the 
evidence is mixed.  On the one hand, some recent articles do little more 
than promise to conduct additional research in the future.250  On the 
other, most authors seem content with the basic threat analysis and 
response framework that synthetic biologists developed between 2006 
and 2008.251  This provides at least some hope that new work will build 
on what has come previously.  Urgent topics include (a) deepening our 
empirical understanding of existing industry screening programs; 
(b) exploring the fundamental security trade-off between human 
screening and other methods; and (c) carefully testing the economic 
assertion that human screening is unsustainable.  The problem, for now, 
is that researchers seem to have moved on to other topics, for example, 
synthetic biology’s impact on “notions of life and the blurring of the line 
between natural and artificial.”252  Alternatively, many European and 
                                                 
249 Id. at 1226 (quoting MITRE researcher James Diggans). 
250 BALMER & MARTIN, supra note 194, at 5 (“This will require a thorough review of 
existing controls and regulations, and the development of new measures, particularly 
relating to biosafety, environmental release and biosecurity.”); Markus Schmidt et al., A 
Priority Paper for the Societal and Ethical Aspects of Synthetic Biology, 3 SYST. & SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY 3, 5 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC2759426/pdf/11693_2009_Article_9034.pdf (advocating “cooperation of DNA 
synthesis companies” and “further developing and improving the technical means (e.g. 
software, databases) used to screen for DNA orders,” and noting that “a balance will need 
to be struck between security gains on one hand and practicability and usefulness on the 
other”). 
251 The Center for American Progress has, however, argued that new reports are needed.  
Denise Caruso, Synthetic Biology:  An Overview and Recommendations for Anticipating and 
Addressing Emerging Risks, SCI. PROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.science 
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/syntheticbiology.pdf.  The argument is based 
on the claim that “[v]irtually all the reports on synthetic biology have come from the 
synthetic biology community or from a proponent’s or an opponent’s point of view.”  Id. at 
9.  This premise seems debatable, except in the usual sense that all reports, including the 
Center’s, are tinged by their authors’ preconceptions.  The Center’s case would be stronger 
if it could point to instances in which the existing literature had overlooked specific issues 
or evidence.  Indeed, this is how academic discourse is supposed to work.  But the Center 
report only complains of unspecified “serious logical flaws and omissions of fact.”  Id. 
252 IDEA League Summerschool, Synthetics:  The Ethics of Synthetic Biology 4 (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/images/uploads/Ethics_of_synthetic_biology.pdf.  
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also developing world scholars have begun developing self-consciously 
regional viewpoints about synthetic biology.253  So far, at least, their 
insights do not seem much different from American ones.254 
C. The Presidential Commission 
Further action ultimately depends on public impatience.  However, 
recent events suggest a concerted effort to convince the public that 
biosecurity is a solved problem.  In late 2009, President Obama created a 
new Presidential Commission to evaluate bioethics.255  Not surprisingly, 
one of the Commission’s first orders of business was to address synthetic 
biology.256  This, however, presented an obvious problem.  Unlike earlier 
panels, the Commission could not simply recommend future action.  
After all, HHS had already drafted Guidelines.  Admitting that this 
document was incomplete would commit the United States to yet 
another round of regulation and keep the larger security debate 
simmering for years. 
The Commission worked hard to avoid this result.  In September 
2010, it held a seventy-five minute hearing on synthetic biology security 
policy.257  This consisted almost entirely of prepared remarks by the 
chairman of NSABB’s synthetic biology working group and two 
executives representing Consortium members.258  Readers who have 
come this far would have found their presentations remarkable.  Indeed, 
none of the speakers so much as mentioned IASB, the tumultuous 
standards war over human screening, or the fact that one of the 
represented companies, Geneart, had recently pressed for a fast and 
cheap automated solution.  Not surprisingly, the two industry panelists 
                                                                                                             
For other recent ethics-oriented projects and reports, see EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132, 
and PARENS ET AL., supra note 196. 
253 See Aim, ORG. FOR INT’L DIALOGUE & CONFLICT MGMT., http://www.idialog.eu/ 
fwf/Aim.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (reporting new project to investigate synthetic 
biology risks in Austria and China). 
254 Some reports claim that security is a lower priority outside the United States.  So far, 
however, there have been few if any concrete suggestions about how this preference 
should translate into policy.  More fundamentally, we have seen that European gene-
makers took the lead in setting private screening standards.  This suggests that the usual 
transatlantic stereotype is badly oversimplified. 
255 Exec. Order No. 13,521, 3 C.F.R. 279 (2009), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 6601 
(Supp. III 2010). 
256 Id. 
257 The session was part of a much broader, two-day set of hearings devoted to synthetic 
biology. 
258 2010 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13.  The event, which was organized by HHS 
staffers, did not include a single panelist who had criticized the agency’s Best Match 
proposal or endorsed IASB’s Code of Conduct. 
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also went out of their way to praise HHS’s Guidelines without once 
mentioning Best Match’s deficiencies.259 
Based on this narrative, the Commission promptly produced a 180-
page report.260  Essentially, its goal is to declare victory and go home.  
“[S]cientists both in and outside government,” the Commission argued, 
have already (a) achieved “a shared culture of responsibility to assure 
safe conduct of research in the largely uncharted world of genetic 
engineering,”261 and (b) developed “practical mechanisms” to implement 
security.262  Furthermore, these oversight mechanisms and bodies were 
“well situated and in the process of reviewing and monitoring the field 
of synthetic biology as it develop[ed].”263  “At this time,” the 
Commission concluded, “the risks posed by synthetic biology activities 
in both settings appear to be appropriately managed.”264  Conversely, the 
Commission sees “no need at this time to create additional agencies or 
oversight bodies focused specifically on synthetic biology.”265 
Still, one awkward loose end remained.  No one doubted that HHS’s 
Best Match algorithm could only detect threats on the Select Agent list.  
Yet, NSABB’s 2006 report and HHS’s Guidelines had both admitted that 
other threats existed.  This implied that synthetic biologists had not 
solved their biosecurity problem after all.  Here, the Commission 
resorted to the familiar tactic of dialing down the threat.  Now, 
retroactively, it argued that NSABB’s 2006 report had been “focused on 
synthesis of select agents and toxins.”266  Furthermore, proposals to 
control access to non-Select Agent sequences had been “[n]oticeably 
absent” from NSABB’s 2010 report.267  This omission, the Commission 
                                                 
259 The slanted presentation was completely predictable.  Consortium members seldom if 
ever mention IASB or its Code in any public forum, press release, published article, or 
interview unless compelled to do so.  This sometimes requires them to rewrite matters of 
public record.  For example, DNA2.0 executive Claes Gustaffson has argued that the idea of 
private security code originated in a “secret pact” by Consortium members in August 2009.  
Grushkin, supra note 215.  This is plainly inconsistent with IASB’s widely publicized efforts 
to create a standard from April 2008 forward.  See supra Part I (discussing these efforts). 
260 See 2010 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13. 
261 Id. at 144. 
262 Id. at 146. 
263 Id. at 124. 
264 Id. at 147.  The Commission did recognize that non-biologist academics and, especially 
hobbyists, “may not be familiar with the standards for ethics and responsible stewardship 
that are commonplace for those working in biomedical research.”  Id. at 134.  It therefore 
urged government to “educate and inform” these groups.  Id.  Even here, however, the 
Commission was careful to add that this was “not a call for specific restraints upon the 
[hobbyist] community at this time.”  Id. at 147. 
265 Id. at 8. 
266 Id. at 73. 
267 Id. 
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insisted, appeared to reflect a deliberate policy judgment that non-Select 
Agent “sequences alone [would] not yield, nor often be sufficient to 
predict, functions.”268  On its face, this elliptical statement seemed to 
imply that screening non-Select Agents was impossible.  This, however, 
was clearly a straw man.  After all, neither the IASB Code nor the 
Consortium Protocol had ever called for examining “sequences alone.”  
Instead, current best practice called for human screeners to compare 
incoming orders against known sequences whose functions were listed 
in Genbank.  The Commission failed to explain why HHS had rejected 
this method, nor did it criticize the agency for publishing guidelines that 
were significantly weaker than the industry’s own standards. 
D. Conclusion 
Synthetic biology’s first decade was marked by interminable debates 
coupled with promises of future action.  The Commission broke sharply 
with this pattern by arguing that existing steps had already solved the 
problem. 
X.  THE ROAD BACK 
At this point, many readers will conclude that the U.S. federal 
government has no appetite for biosecurity.  However, we have seen that 
rank-and-file synthetic biologists have often pursued reforms without 
waiting for official action.  This Part asks what community members can 
still do to bring synthetic biology’s security agenda back from the brink. 
A. Screening 
Industry’s commitment to the Code and Protocol remains fragile.  
The trick will be to bring prompt, public criticism to bear on any 
company that downgrades its standards. 
The standard that prevails will, in turn, determine the future of 
screening.  Automated systems based on lists are, by definition, static.  
Because the whole point is to avoid human screening, companies have 
little opportunity or incentive to find new threats.  This suggests that 
lists will evolve slowly, if at all. By comparison, human screening forces 
companies to examine each and every order that comes in the door.  This 
is expensive and creates powerful incentives for gene-makers to save and 
reuse screeners’ work.269  This should lead to increasingly complete 
                                                 
268 Id. 
269 Strong databases mean that screeners only need to examine a particular Genbank 
sequence once.  The resulting savings are substantial.  Indeed, companies currently 
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threat lists over time.  Moreover, these savings will be even larger if 
companies agree to pool their data.  IASB and the University of 
California, Berkeley project recently created pilot scale software 
(“VIREP”) to help gene-makers do this.  Here, the ultimate goal is to 
produce a joint-threat database in much the same way that companies 
currently work together to write Apache and other open source software 
programs.270 
Even if human screening survives, there will still be much to do.  As 
long as the Consortium’s meetings and membership are closed, no one 
can be sure how rigorously the Protocol is being implemented.  Worse, 
gene-makers have an obvious incentive to decide close questions in favor 
of filling orders.  VIREP-style sharing limits this tendency by ensuring 
that every threat judgment is open to scrutiny and, if necessary, criticism.  
More generally, the existence of a parallel Code and Protocol can only 
promote mischief.  The synthetic biology community should demand 
that IASB and the Consortium merge their standards.  Thereafter, any 
amendments to the merged standard should be (a) voted on by all active 
gene-makers regardless of size, and (b) conducted in meetings open to 
both public and press. 
B. Experiments of Concern and Education 
Given NSABB’s recommendation, HHS is overwhelmingly likely to 
develop a review system for experiments of concern.  The only real 
question is whether the new regulations will do any good.  Here, the 
main uncertainties are (a) whether scientists contemplating experiments 
of concern will actually request reviews, and (b) whether the new review 
bodies will be more than a rubber stamp.  With respect to the first 
question, much will depend on journal editors.  If editors reliably refuse 
to publish experiments performed without advance review, few if any 
authors will skirt the system.  Deterrence will only work, however, if 
editors withhold forgiveness.  For this reason, the system’s ultimate 
integrity will depend on whether government officials and academic 
leaders are willing to criticize editors who publish un-reviewed work. 
The second question is more searching.  No amount of detailed 
regulation can keep friendly review bodies from rubber-stamping 
                                                                                                             
estimate that they have seen up to five percent of all sequences before.  Maurer et al., supra 
note 1, at 24. 
270 The business case for sharing threat data is identical to the logic behind Apache and 
other open source collaborations.  Because companies do not compete for customers on the 
basis of who has the best threat database, they have no reason to hoard data.  At the same 
time, shared data cuts each company’s costs. 
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results.271  Ultimately, the quality of review will have to rest on the 
reviewers’ own professionalism.  This can, however, be bolstered by 
insisting that reviewers write detailed opinions explaining why each 
experiment should or should not go forward.  Furthermore, these 
opinions should be available for public inspection, either immediately or 
following some brief interval.272  With luck, exposing opinions to critics 
will do more than keep reviewers honest.  It will also lead to new and 
better policies.  Public opinions will allow scholars to collect, criticize, 
and (with luck) harmonize reviewers’ instincts. 
C. Broader Lessons:  U.S. Government Policy 
The most striking lesson from synthetic biology’s first decade is that 
traditional government regulation is not the only way to accomplish 
security.  Indeed, in a world of shrinking American power it may not 
even be the most effective way.  We have seen that the commercial and 
arguably also the academic communities are capable of self-governance.  
Indeed, their standards, contrary to expectations,273 are often more 
stringent than the government’s.274 
The Best Match debacle is, in large measure, the story of what 
happens when government ignores private standards.  Reform must 
begin, therefore, by making sure that officials pay more attention next 
time.275  The federal government can do this by developing formal 
guidelines to help agencies decide what to do and say when commercial 
                                                 
271 This will be especially true if, as it seems likely, most experiments of concern turn out 
to be harmless. 
272 The claim is sometimes made that publishing reviews will disclose valuable research 
ideas to the researchers’ competitors.  But this will not matter if competitors know that the 
researcher has an insurmountable head start.  Embargoing reviews for one year should 
almost always be sufficient. 
273 The editors of Nature had confidently predicted that private standards would 
inevitably be weaker than public ones.  Pathways to Security, supra note 210, at 432. 
274 This observation raises interesting political economy questions.  Political theory 
suggests that government agencies tend to be strongly influenced by narrow and often 
extreme interests.  This probably explains why HHS chose a more lenient standard than the 
industry itself.  Standards wars, on the other hand, are rough and tumble affairs that 
produce winning standards almost at random.  On average, at least, one would expect 
these views to be relatively mainstream.  Stephen M. Maurer, Beyond Treaties and Regulation:  
Using Market Forces to Control Dual Use Technologies 12 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Goldman 
Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP10-010, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705630. 
275 Official indifference has been a recurring obstacle for private entrepreneurs trying to 
organize for a public purpose.  For additional examples, see Stephen M. Maurer, Five Easy 
Pieces:  Case Studies of Entrepreneurs Who Organized Private Communities for a Public Purpose 
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP10-011, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713329. 
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or academic standards overlap their mission.276  This kind of guidance 
would admittedly have to address deep issues.  When are private 
standards economically feasible or likely to be more effective than formal 
regulation or treaty?  When should government encourage existing 
private standards initiatives or instigate new ones?277  When should the 
government intervene in private standards wars by, for example, 
praising one side or the other?278  And how should the government 
shape its own regulations so that they build on, rather than ignore or 
dismantle, what the private sector has done? 
At the same time, it is probably more important to ask these 
questions than answer them.  Just recognizing that government has an 
obligation to engage with commercial and academic standards will be an 
enormous step forward. 
XI.  CONCLUSION:  EXPECTING MORE 
This Article has described the first ten years of synthetic biology’s 
security agenda, its collapse in 2009−2010, and the prospects for reviving 
it.  Many readers will find this picture discouraging.  They shouldn’t.  
Most law review articles, after all, end by proposing schemes that have 
no chance at all of being implemented.  By comparison, the idea that the 
federal government will one day enact, say, human screening seems 
eminently feasible. 
For the past decade, synthetic biology scholars have almost always 
assumed that the time for taking action was five or ten years distant.  
Things are different now that government has tried to act and failed.  Of 
course, we can still hope that future government regulations will work 
better.  But that seems unreasonable.  HHS’s stubborn defense of its 
                                                 
276 Convening a National Research Council committee would be a good first step. 
277 This will inevitably include addressing activists’ claims that self-governance allows 
scientists “to act as judge and jury.”  Service, supra note 25, at 1116 (quoting activist Sue 
Mayer).  This argument is far from self-evident, because it assumes a false choice between 
self-governance and traditional government regulation.  In fact, self-governance “does not 
preclude other forms of governance, any more than the possession of conscience makes 
redundant the strictures of law.”  Policing Ourselves, 441 NATURE 383, 383 (2006).  More 
precisely, the activists’ argument requires the additional assumption that self-regulation 
changes outcomes by creating “a public image of scientific responsibility . . . that 
delay[s] . . . appropriate government regulation.”  Synthetic Biology—Global Societal Review 
Urgent!, ETCGROUP 3–4, http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/11/01/synbiolet 
bckgroundfinal.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  Even then, it is hard to see why 
communities should not have the same right to make ethical judgments that individuals 
do. 
278 Similar government jawboning of private companies is already familiar when it comes 
to the domestic economy.  For a classic account, see GRANT MCCONNELL, STEEL AND THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1962 (1963). 
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hapless-but-cheap Best Match standard is no accident.  “[E]ven a dog,” 
as Justice Holmes tells us, “distinguishes between being stumbled over 
and being kicked.”279 
Synthetic biology’s security agenda has reached a critical moment.  
On the one hand, the Presidential Commission has told the country that 
synthetic biology has a functioning “culture of responsibility,” is 
adequately managing its risks, and does not need to revisit Best Match.  
On the other, very little of this can be squared with mainstream scholars’ 
persistent warnings that biological warfare threats are real and deserve 
be taken seriously.  The question now is whether anyone will notice. 
Much depends on the scholars themselves.  If they speak out, 
synthetic biology’s security agenda may yet come back stronger than 
ever. 
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